Im Rahmen der von Herrn Prof. Dr. Thomas Krödel organisierten Ringvorlesung "Geist, Gehirn, Bewusstsein" des Philosophischen Seminars.

Whow does a subject have to relate to her body so as to constitute paradigmatic embodiment? What makes it the case that a subject is aware of some material object as its body? Ways of 'losing one's body' – such as locked-in syndrome, anarchic hand syndrome, deafferentation, or out-of-body experiences – come from disruptions to the normal functional relation between a subject and her body. This suggests that at the heart of embodiment is a certain functional structure between a subject and her body. What is required for this functional structure? I argue that an account of core normal human embodiment requires that we consider different aspects of how subjects are aware of their bodies. I will consider the consequences of this for our understanding of subjects and also pathologies of embodiment.