Welcome to the online course on Nibana Salmons 23 to 33, a course hosted by the Nomota Center
for Body Studies at the University of Hamburg in collaboration with the Barre Center for
Body Studies in Massachusetts. And today we will be looking at sermon 25. But before that,
just a few comments from the forum related to the last lecture. When we'll demo dinner on the
Charana picture. To me, this Charana picture of the mind and its own chasing itself speaks of the
structural hyperkinetic disorder of the world and samsara at large by way of Ayuniso Monasikara,
a term which could even be somewhat freely paraphrased as samsaric attention deficit or
disorder. What is the deficit here? It is the lack of Ayuniso Monasikara, radical attention that
penetrates the arising of the matrix of the world. I particularly like that samsaric attention deficit
disorder. And on the same Charana picture, the entire picture show is constructed on a perversion,
a misperceiving permanence in what is actually impermanent. Furthermore, this constructed world
rises dependent on sense-based diets and consciousness born of contact, which brings
up again the image of the vortex, like a whirlpool gathering flotsam. Exit is found at the bottom,
in the still deep waters, but letting go is required. I like the exit is found at the bottom.
Robert on impermanence. This brings to mind the topic of confirmation bias described by cognitive
psychology. If we assume the world to be permanent, this view is projected onto our sensory experience,
creating a permanent facade. This facade is supported by our intoxication with the influxes
and held together by the glue of craving. What is more, this facade is what we then experience
as the real thing, what we touch with our hands and see with our eyes. I found this very skillful
how Robert brought in confirmation bias. And Henry on the by instruction. Because of the
implementation of mindfulness, one is in a position to step away from all the lust usually
created through unmindful and unwise attention to the six sense spheres in order to arrive closer
at the extirpation of lust for the sense forms and for existence. Yeah, that is, I think, exactly
the point. The importance of mindfulness, that is really the key here. So now time to look at sermon
25.
This is peaceful. And this is excellent. Namely, the steering of all preparations,
the relinquishment of all assets, the destruction of craving, detachment, cessation, extinction.
With the permission of the most venerable great preceptor and the assembly of the
venerable meditative monks. This is the 25th sermon in the series of sermons on Nibana.
The other day, we made an attempt to understand in the light of the Kalaka Ramasuddha and the
enlightened attitude of the tathāgatā who has realized the cessation of the six spaces of sense
contact towards the viewpoints of the worldlings who find themselves confined within those six
spaces. In that discourse, the Buddha declared with the words tāṅ ahaṅ jānāmī,
all that do I know, the fact that he has understood all what the world with its gods
Maras and Brahmās and the progeny consisting of recluses and brahmins, gods and men, have seen,
heard, sensed, cognized, thought after and pondered over by the mind.
By his next assertion, tāṅ ahaṅ abhanyāsīṇa, the Buddha proclaimed that he not only knows all that,
but knows it thoroughly in some special way. With the words tāṅ tathāgatāṣa viditāṅ,
he declares that by virtue of this special knowledge, he has understood all what the world
claims to know. Despite this special knowledge and understanding, the tathāgatā takes no
stance and has no inclination or partiality towards those sensory data, as is evident from
the expression tāṅ tathāgatāṅ ahaṅ abhanyāsī. Worldlings in general are in the habit of asserting
dogmatically, I know, I see, it is verily so, jānaṅi paśāmi tathīvaitāṅ, when they have a special
knowledge or understanding of something or other. But according to this discourse, it seems that the
Buddha takes no stance and has no inclination or partiality towards those sensory data,
precisely because he has a special knowledge and understanding with regard to them.
This fact is highlighted by the concluding summary verses, particularly by the lines
jānaṅi paśāmi tathīvaitāṅ ajositāṅ nādīn tathāgatāṅaṅ. I know, I see, this is verily so,
no such clinging for the tathāgatās. In order to explain this strange difference of attitude,
we quoted the other day two significant terms from the Mūlāpāryāyasukta of the Manjī-manikārya,
namely Sanjānārati and Abhijānārati. They represent two levels of knowledge in the
context of that particular discourse. Sanjānārati stands for perceptual knowledge, whereas Abhijānārati
conveys the idea of some special understanding of a higher order.
The level of knowledge implied by the term Sanjānārati is that which characterizes the
ordinary worldling's worldview. He is deluded by the mirāj-like perception in his view of the world
and goes on imagining Manjana, a real world, enslaved to the patterns of the grammatical
structure. But the tathāgatā has penetrated into the true nature of those scenes,
herds, sensed, and the like, with his extraordinary level of higher knowledge, Abhijā,
yielding full comprehension. Therefore, he does not take a stand upon any of them.
He has no stance to justify the usage of the term upatāsī, since he does not entertain imaginings,
manjana. What is called manjana is the imagining in egoistic terms, imparting reality to illusory
things. It is this principle of refraining from vain imaginings, that is indicated by the term
napatāsī, does not take his stand upon. Tathāgatās have no clinging or entanglement,
a jositang, precisely because they entertain no imaginings. In regard to things seen,
heard, etc., the tathāgatās have no clinging, binding, or entanglement, by way of craving,
conceit, and views, respectively. We happened to mention the other day
that those peculiar declarations with which the kālaka-ramasukta opens bear some resemblance to
the tetralema discussed in our treatment of the undetermined points. The set of four
alternative propositions concerning the tathāgatās, death after death state,
may be cited as a paradigm for the tetralema. Hauti tathāgatā parangmarana, the tathāgatā
exists after death. Na hauti tathāgatā parangmarana, the tathāgatā does not exist
after death. Hauti ca na hauti tathāgatā parangmarana, the tathāgatā both exists
and does not exist after death. Na hauti na nā hauti tathāgatā parangmarana, the tathāgatā
neither exists nor does not exist after death. The declarations found in this discourse bear
some affinity to the above-mentioned tetralema. However, we find here the Buddha making the first
declaration in several stages. Firstly, he makes the statement that whatever is seen, heard,
sensed and cognized, thought after and pondered over by all beings in the world that he knows.
In the second statement, he affirms that he has a higher knowledge of all that.
Then comes a sentence which reaffirms that the tathāgatā has understood,
but ends with a statement that the tathāgatā does not take his stand upon it.
Generally, when confronted with the tetralema, the Buddha summarily dismisses all the four
alternative propositions. But here the peculiarity is in not dismissing the first proposition at once.
He declares that he knows, that he has a higher knowledge, and that he has understood all that.
Apparently, he is affirming the first proposition, granting the validity of sensory data.
But then comes the concluding statement to the effect that he does not take his stand upon them,
now patarsi, which amounts to a negation. The secret behind this peculiar presentation
will emerge when we bring up the proper similes and parables. Till then, what can be gleaned from
the context is that the tathāgatā has no stance, not because he is ignorant, but due to the very
fact that he knows fully well and has understood the nature of the sum total of sensory data.
The wordlings are prone to think that it is when convincing knowledge is lacking that one has no
such stance. But the Buddha declares here that he takes no stance in regard to what is seen,
heard, sensed, etc., precisely because he has a special understanding, a penetrative knowledge
of the essencelessness of the data obtained through the six sense bases. So it seems in this context
too, we have the negation of the first alternative, as is usual in the case of a tetralema,
only that the negation is expressed here in a very peculiar way.
Let us now take up the second declaration.
If I were to say monks, whatsoever in the world, with its gods,
maras and brahmas, among the progeny consisting of recluses and brahmins, gods and men,
whatsoever is seen, heard, sensed and cognized, thought after and pondered over by the mind,
all that I do not know, it would be a falsehood in me.
Because if I were to say in this world with its devas, maras and brahma, among its population,
with its ascetics and brahmins, its devas and humans, whatever is seen, heard, sensed,
cognized, reached, sought after, examined by the mind, that I do not know,
that would be a falsehood on my part. End of comment.
There is a difference of opinion as to the correct reading of this second declaration.
Deep suttas often present difficulties in determining the exact reading,
and this is especially the case with the kālokārāma sutta.
In this instance, the commentary has followed the reading tāngohang jānāmi dīvadeyān,
tāngmāmā samuśā. If I were to say that I know, it would be a falsehood in me.
But, as we have pointed out earlier, this reading is not meaningful.
That is probably why the chattasangi tīpitaka edition has followed the variant reading tāngohang
nājānāmi dīvadeyān, if I were to say that I do not know.
This departure from the commentary tradition seems justifiable,
since the Buddha has already declared that he knows all that.
It stands for a reason, therefore, that in the second declaration he makes it clear that to say
I do not know would be a contradiction, a falsehood. But why this clarification?
Generally, the whirlings expect one to unequivocally assert and take one's stand
upon one's viewpoint in categorical terms. As expressed by the dictum ida-meva satchan,
mo-gang-anyang, this alone is true, all else is false. Failure to do so is recognized as a
lack of knowledge or precision. The second declaration is meant to
forestore such an objection, since the first declaration ends with the cause
tāngtā tūnaupataśī, but that the tāgita has not taken his stand upon it.
So it amounts to a statement like, it is not because I do not know that I take no stands.
In the same strain we can explain the declarations that follow.
It seems then that the second declaration, tāngohang nājānāmi dīvadeyān,
tāngohamāsā mūsā, if I were to say all that I do not know, it would be a falsehood in me,
amounts to the second alternative of the tātūlāmā. The next declaration follows the same trend.
To quote the relevant portion, tāngohang jānāmi dīvadeyān, tāṁpaśitāri sāmīvā.
If I were to say I both know it and do not know it, that too would be a falsehood in me.
In regard to the aforesaid scenes, heard, sensed, etc., if I were to say that I know,
I do not know, or even a combination of both those statements, as I both know and do not know,
it would be a falsehood on my part. Why? Because the world is accustomed to put down such a
vacillation to a lack of certitude. To say I both know it and know it not, looks like a confession
of partial knowledge, since it can mean knowledge and ignorance going fifty-fifty. So the Buddha
says, in this instance too, that it would likely be a falsehood, tāṁpaśitāri sāmīvā.
Now we come to the fourth statement. The Buddha declares, if I were to say I neither know it,
nor am ignorant of it, it would be a fault in me.
We can understand that position too. Generally the worldlings think that the refusal to make
a categorical statement is either due to partial knowledge or to an attitude of wriggling out.
In fact, this attitude of wriggling out had already assumed the status of a philosophy.
In it so, in Sanjaya Belaktibuddha, a contemporary of the Buddha. When he was interrogated,
he would respond with such a series of negations, like I do not say it is, I do not say it is thus,
I do not say it is otherwise, nor do I say it is neither, etc. The attempt here is to evade the
issue by a sort of eel wriggling. That school of philosophy, which resorted to such an evasive
legitimate, came to be known as Amarabhikāpavāda. The Buddha refuses to subscribe to such tactical
sophistry by rejecting the fourth alternative, I neither know it nor am ignorant of it.
Here then we have the same Tetra Lemma, presented in a different guise. It smacks of a riddle that
the Buddha was confronted with, the riddle of coming to terms with worldly parlance.
As we have already mentioned, the commentary analyzes the main theme of the discourse
into five planes. It also recalls that the earth shook at five points of the discourse,
that is, at the end of the Prolegation for each plane.
According to the commentary, the first plane is the plane of omniscience,
Sabhanyutabhroni. The phrases representative of that plane are said to be Tangahang Jahanami,
that I know, Tangahang Abhanyasi, that have I fully understood, and Tang Tatagata Selviritang,
that is known to the Tatagata. Commonly, the idea that the Buddha was omniscient is clearly a
later development, although this later development is shared by all the different Buddhist traditions.
But the closer study of the early Buddhist discourses makes it quite clear that at that
level in the development, in the history of Buddhism, the Buddha was not yet held to be
omniscient. I have studied this in detail, and this is one of two readings, additional readings
for this 25th lecture, at part of a book on the evolution of the Abhidharma. And there I have
summarized my research on the passages relevant to the idea that the Buddha was omniscient.
And for those of you who do not have the time or inclination to follow this up in detail,
that's a very simple argument proposed by Richard Combridge. If we look at the text on monastic
discipline, the Vinaya, we find time and again that the Buddha is on record for giving a particular
rule or regulation, and then it doesn't work, something has to be changed, something has to be
adjusted. And this is quite a pervasive trend in Vinaya literature. And all of this, of course,
does not really work with the idea that the Buddha was omniscient. If he had been omniscient,
he should have known all the facts and related causes and conditions to that particular
problem and should have been able to address it straight away with a rule that works forever
rather than having to adjust and re-adjust. And there are also a number of passages in the
suttas that show the Buddha coming across something unexpected. Again, that would not
really work with the idea of the Buddha being omniscient. So in the case of the Kalakarama sutta,
these affirmations, Tangahang Jahanami, Tangang Abhanyasing, Tang Tatagata Savititang,
that I know, I have fully understood it, that is known to the Tatagata, should be understood in
the sense of penetrative knowledge, seeing through understanding fully rather than comprehensive
knowledge in the sense of knowing each and every detail. Then comes the plane of the Influx Free One,
Dina Sababhongi, represented by the section ending with the phrase,
Now Patasi, does not take his stand upon it. It is so called because that phrase brings out
the characteristic of not taking a stance by way of cravings, conceits and views,
in the case of an Influx Free One. The three phrases, Tang Mamasa Musa, it will be a
fursuit on my part, Tang Pasathari Samivam, likewise, that too will be a fursuit in me,
and Tang Mamasa Kali, it will be a fault in me, are interpreted by the commentary as representing
the third plane of truth, Satyabhoomi. We have now dealt with that too.
What comes next as the fourth plane is the deepest of all. The commentary calls it the
plane of the void, Sunyatabhoomi. It is with good reason that it is so called.
The paragraph that follows, it's said to represent that plane. It runs,
as if it is the first plane of the void, as if it is the third plane of the void,
as if it is the third plane of the void, as if it is the third plane of the void,
as if it is the third plane of the void,
and as if it is the third plane of the void,
as if it is the third plane of the void,
things. To begin with, here we have given the phrase
ditta databang ditta, whereas the commentary takes it as datta databang ditta.
According to the commentary, datta is a hypothetical variant of the absolute form dhisva.
Four paraphrases, datta databang ti dhisva databang, that is, datta databang stands for
dhisva databang. So the whole sentence in question is said
to convey the sense, having seen, he doesn't imagine a scene worth seeing.
But the variant reading ditta is granted, though the commentary prefers the reading
datta as it is suggestive of the absolute dritva.
Taking the cue from this commentarial preference, the Burmese chapter-sangi-di edition goes
a step further in substituting sutva, mutva, and vignata, rather arbitrarily to give an
absolutive twist to the three phrases that follow, as sutva, sutabang, sutta, mutva,
mutta, vignata, and vignata. Probably the editors thought that in this context
the terms ditta, sutta, mutta, and vignata could not be interpreted as they are.
But we may point out that in keeping with the line of interpretation we have followed
so far, these three terms may be sad to stand for an extremely deep dimension of this discourse
dealing with the void. The other day we simply gave a sketch of a possible rendering.
The statement ditta, databang, ditta, namanjati, has to be interpreted as an assertion that
ditta-tarata does not imagine a sight worthwhile seeing as apart from the scene. That there
is nothing substantial in the scene.
So also the other statements, sutta, sutabang, sutta, namanjati, does not imagine a worthwhile
hearing apart from the heard. Mutta, muttabang, mutta, namanjati, does not imagine a worthwhile
sensing apart from the sensed. Vignata, vignata, vignata, namanjati, does not imagine a worthwhile
cognition apart from the cognized.
In case our interpretation still appears problematic, we may hark back to the bhaya
sutta we have already explained at length. The philosophy behind the Buddha's exhortation
to the ascetic bhaya could be summed up in the words ditta, databang, bhavisati, sutta,
matang, bhavisati, mutta, mutta, matang, bhavisati, vignata, vignata, matang, bhavisati.
In the scene there will be just the scene, in the heard there will be just the heard,
in the sensed there will be just the sensed, in the cognized there will be just the cognized.
What is meant is that one has to stop at just the scene without discursively imagining that
there is some thing seen, some thing substantial behind the scene. Similarly, in regard to
the heard, one has to take it as just the heard, not the something heard. In the case
of the phrase dikta, databang, ditta, namanjati, the word dikta being in the uplative case,
we may relate as does not imagine a sight worth seeing as apart from the scene. By way
of further clarification of this point, we may revert to the simile of the dog on the
plank, which we gave in our explanation of Nama Rupam. The simile is of course not canonical,
but of fable origin. When a dog, while crossing a stream, stops halfway on the plank and
starts wagging its tail, peeping curiously down, the reason is the sight of its own image
in the water. It imagines a dog there, a water dog. The dog thinks that there is something
worth while seeing, apart from the scene. It is unaware of the fact that it is seeing
what it sees because it is looking. It thinks that it is looking because there is something
out there to be seen. The moment it realizes that it is seeing because it is looking, it
will stop looking at its own image in the water. We have here a very subtle point in
the law of dependent arising, one that is integral to the analysis of name and form.
So then, due to the very ignorance of the fact that it is seeing because it is looking,
the dog imagines another dog there in the water. What is called manyana is an imagining
of that sort. No such imagining is the end of the tatagata. He does not imagine a sight
worth seeing as apart from the scene. In short, for him the scene is to be all and to end
all of it. The scene is dependently arisen. It comes
about due to a collocation of conditions apart from which it has no existence per se. Every
instance of looking down at the water is a fresh experience and every time an image of
the dog in the water and of another looking at it is created. The dog is seeing its own
image. Everything is dependently arisen. Pasapachaya says the brahmajala sutta. Dependent
on contact. Here there is something really deep. It is
because of the personality view, sakmaka yaditi, that the world is carried away by this illusion.
One goes on looking, saying that one is doing so as there is something to be seen, but the
scene is there because of the looking. This then is the moral behind the statement ditaraktabang
ditangnamangyati. Does not imagine a scene worth seeing as apart from the scene.
This is the dictum implicit in the Bhaiya sutta too, which could be illustrated by the simile
of the dog on the plank. The tatagata does not imagine a sight existing, does not imagine
a sight as existing from the bare act of seeing. If further illustrations are needed,
let us take the case of hearing music from a distance. One imagines a thing called music,
and with the idea of listening to the same music goes to the place where the music is going on.
One is not aware of the fact that at each step in that direction one is hearing a different music.
Why? Because one is ignorant of the law of dependent arising.
Just as in the former case the dog scene is dependent on the dog looking,
here too the auditory consciousness of a music is the outcome of a dependence between ear and sound.
So, deluded as he is, he goes to the music hall to listen better to the same music.
He will realize the extent of his delusion if he happens to put his ear to the musical instrument.
When he does so, he will hear not a music, but a set of crude vibrations.
But this is what is going on in the world. The world is steeped in the delusion of imagining
that it is the same music one is hearing. Though at each step in that direction the music changes.
This is due to the fact that it is dependently arisen. Actually there is no person hearing,
but only a state of affairs dependent on the ear and sound. A condition to rising dependent
on contact. In the present textural context the terms ditta, sutta, mutta and vignata,
seen, heard, sensed and cognized have to be understood in this light.
So, this is how the phrase ditta, dattabang, ditang, namanjati has to be interpreted.
But the commentary does not seem to have appreciated the relevance of this paragraph
to the Buddha's teaching on voidness. While commenting on ditang, namanjati, it expatiates,
according to it what is meant is that at a time that does not imagine by way of cravings,
conceits and views, that he is seeing just what the common people have seen.
This is an oversimplification, a rather shallow interpretation.
The next phrase, aditang, namanjati, is similarly explained. Aditang, namanjati,
ahang, mahajanin, aditami, vaitan, passami, diti, evampi, tanha, dihi, manyana, ahi,
manyana, namanjati. It does not imagine an unseen, means that the tatangata does not imagine by way
of imaginings, through craving, etc., that he is seeing something unseen by the common people.
The commentary, it seems, has gone at a tangent by a passing the deeper sense.
We have already explained the deeper significance of the phrase ditang, namanjati, does not imagine
a scene. Now what does aditang, namanjati mean? In terms of our simile of the dog on the plank,
ditang, namanjati means that the tatatagata does not imagine a dog in the water. Aditang, namanjati
could therefore mean that the tatagata does not imagine that the dog has not seen.
Why it does not treat it as an unseen should be clear from that declaration we had already cited,
ending with tanha, najanami, dibadeyang, tanma, mamasa, musa. If I were to say that I do not know,
it would be a falsehood in me. The fact of seeing is not denied, though what is seen is not taken
as a dog, but only as an image of one, that is, dependently arisen. Since the understanding of it
as a dependently arisen phenomena is there, the tatagata does not imagine an unseen either.
The phrase databang, namanjati is also expectable in the light of the foregoing discussion.
Now the dog on the plank keeps on looking down at the water again and again, because it thinks
that there is something worthwhile seeing in the water. Such a delusion is not there in the
tatagata. He knows that at each turn it is a phenomenon of a seen dependently arisen,
dependent on contact past the pakchiyar. Every time it happens, it is a fresh sight,
a new preparation sankhara. So there is nothing to look for in it.
Only looking is there, nothing worth looking at. Only seeing is there, nothing to be seen.
Apart from the bare act of hearing, there is nothing to be heard.
It is the wrong view of a self that gives a notion of substantiality.
The above phrase, therefore, is suggestive of insubstantiality, essencelessness and voidness.
Music is just a word. By taking seriously the concept behind that word, one imagines a thing
called music. The pandemonium created by a number of musical instruments is subsumed under the word
music. Then one goes all the way to listen to it. The same state of affairs prevails in the case
of the seen. It is because the tatagata has understood this fact that he does not imagine
a thing worth seeing or hearing. The same applies to the other sensory datum. Then comes the phrase
datum taranamanyate, does not imagine a seer. Here we have the direct expression of voidness,
the voidness of a self or anything belonging to a self. Now that dog on the plank has not understood
the fact that there is a mutual relationship between the looking dog and the seen dog.
It is because of the looking dog that the seen dog is seen. There is a conditioned relationship
between the two. In other words, dependent on eye and forms arises eye consciousness.
The mere presence of the eye is not enough for eye consciousness to arise,
but dependent on eye and forms arises eye consciousness. Though stated simply, it has
a depth that is not easy to fathom. To say that it is dependent on eye and form is to admit that
it is dependently arisen. The law of dependent advising is already implicated. There is therefore
no seer, apart from the phenomenon of seeing, according to the tatagata. He does not imagine
a seer, dataranamanyate. For the wordling, the mere act of seeing carries with it the perception
of one who sees. He is a notion of a self and something belonging to a self. The same teaching
is found in the bhaya suttam. After instructing bhaya to stop at just the seen, the heard,
the sensed and the cognized, the wonder goes on to outline the end result of that training.
And when to your bhaya there will be in the seen, just the seen, in the heard, just the heard,
in the sense, just the sensed, in the cognized, just the cognized, then bhaya you are not by it.
And when bhaya you are not by it, then bhaya you are not in it. And when bhaya you are not in it,
then bhaya you are neither here nor there nor in between. This itself is the end of suffering.
Common, translation by Ireland. When bhaya in the seen is merely what is seen, in the heard is merely
what is heard, in the sensed is merely what is sensed, in the cognized is merely what is cognized,
then bhaya you will not be with that. When bhaya you are not with that, then bhaya you will not be
in that. When bhaya you are not in that, then bhaya you will be neither here nor beyond nor in
between the two. Just this is the end of suffering. End of comment. That is to say, when bhaya you
have gone through that training of stopping at just the seen, the heard, the sensed and the
cognized, then you would not be imagining in terms of them. The algebraic-like expressions
nathayna and nathakta have to be understood as forms of egoistic imagining, manyana.
When you do not imagine in terms of them, you would not be in them. There would be no involvement in
regard to them. In the case of that music, for instance, you would not be in the orchestra.
The egoistic imagining, implicating involvement with the music, presupposes a hero, sutara,
dwelling in the orchestra. When bhaya you do not dwell in it, yathutvaṅbhaya nathakta,
then bhaya you are neither here nor there nor in between the two.
Tatatvang bhaya niridha nograṅ nogbhaya mantarena. This itself is the end of suffering.
In other words, you would have realized voidness sunyata.
The expression tārāṇa-manyati does not imagine a seeran, so tārāṇa-manyati does not imagine a
hero, or tārāṇa-manyati does not imagine a censor, vinyātārāṇa-manyati does not imagine
a knower, have to be understood in this light. The tathāgara does not even imagine a thinker
apart from thought. This is the plane of the void, sunyata-bhoni, the perfect realization
of the corelessness or essencelessness of the seen, the hurt, the sensed and the cognized.
The very absence of manyana or egoistic imagining is to be understood by sunyata-bhomi or the plane
of the void. The whirling takes serious and the subject-object relationship in the grammatical
structure, as it seems the simplest explanation of phenomena. Because there is something to be
seen, there is someone who sees. Because there is someone who sees, there is something to be seen.
There is a duality between these two. To understand the law of dependent arising is
to be free from this duality. It is the ability to see a concatenation of conditions,
a conglomeration of causal factors, an assemblage instead of a bifurcation.
The way of the whirling solver is to follow the subject-object relationship,
a naive acceptance of the grammatical structure, which is the easiest mode of communication of
ideas. They are misled by it to take seriously such notions as one who sees and a thing seen,
one who hears and a thing heard. But the tathāgata is free from that delusion.
Now we come to the fifth section of the discourse, known as the tāri-bhomi,
the plane of the such. It runs
Thus, amongst the tathāgata being such in regard to all phenomena, seen, heard,
sensed and cognized is such. More than he who is such, there is none other high or more excellent,
I declare. Common translation by a bigger body. Thus, because being ever stable among things,
seen, heard, sensed and cognized, the tathāgata is a stable one. And I say there is no stable one
more excellent or sublime than that stable one. The most difficult word here is tāri.
We have already explained it to some extent. It can be rendered by such or less. The commentary
explains it by the phrase tārita nāma eka sādīsata, such as means to be always alike.
By way of illustration, the commentary states tātārato ca yādīsū lābhādīsū tādīsū
vā alābhādīsū. As he is in regard to gain, so is the tārita in regard to loss.
The allusion here is to the eight worldly vicissitudes, gain loss, fame ill fame,
praise plane and pleasure pain. But this explanation is rather misleading,
as he ignores a certain deep dimension of the meaning of the word of the term tādī.
When it is said as he is in regard to gain, so is he in regard to loss. One can ask,
how is he in regard to gain? This is imprecise as a meaning.
However, the commentary happens to quote from the Mahānīdīsa another explanation,
which is more to the point. It is briefly stated as itta-anitta-tādī, such in regard to the
reliable and the undesirable, and explained as lābhādī, alābhādī, yāsīpītādī, yāsīpītādī,
nindāyāpītādī, paśangsāyāpītādī, sukepītādī, dukepītādī. He is such in gain as well as in loss,
he is such in fame as well as in ill fame, etc. That is the correct explanation.
Instead of saying, as he is in gain, so he is in loss, we have here continuous suchness in
regard to all vicissitudes. He is such in gain as well as in loss, he is such in fame as well
as in ill fame, he is such in praise as well as in blame, he is such in pleasure as well as in pain.
Comment. Yeah, I'm not quite sure I understand the point, the distinction the whenever is making
here and I'm giving the commentary here, the relevant passage. So if you look at it,
so it's quoting and saying that he is like equal.
So it is based on this ekāsādī satā that then we get the statement that the tathārata is
with gains as he is with lack of gains and then tena-bhūtān, for this reason, it is said
lābe-pītādī, alābe-pītādī, etc. This is actually then the quote from the Mahānidāsa.
So the statement made by the commentary is simply a summary of the full statement given
in the Mahānidāsa. I fail to see a substantial difference between what the commentary says and
what the Mahānidāsa says and therefore I'm unable to understand why the Venuvanyānanda finds this
misleading and inappropriate. In general, I appreciate the need to be critical with the
commentary and there are a number of occasions and Venuvanyānanda has clearly shown that
where the commentary misses out the deeper sense of a particular passage.
But in the present case, I think that the commentary is as far as I can understand within
the limits of my ignorance and understanding the commentary is fine and there is no need to
criticize it. End of comment.
The reason for this suchness we have explained on an early occasion.
In one sense, the term tādī stands for the understanding of the norm called tatatā.
The other implication is the abstinence from the tendency towards identification or acquisition
meant by tāmmayatā. This exemplary trait is called a tāmmayatā. This is an extremely
important term occurring in the discourses which however has fallen into neglected present.
In the case of music, for instance, tāmmayatā would imply an attachment to it that amounts to
an identification with it. Tāmmayo means made of that, as in suvannamaya, made of gold, in rajatamaya,
made of silver. To be free from this tāmmayatā is to be tādī, such that is to say not to be of
that stuff, but tāmmayatā. The attitude of not leaning on or grasping is meant by it.
The quality of being tādī or such is often rendered by firmness, steadfastness and immovability.
Generally, one associates firmness, immovability or stability with holding on or leaning on.
But here we have just the contrary. Not to hold on to anything is to be such.
The suchness has a flexibility of a higher order, or adaptability.
The adaptability characteristic of the sage, who lives on pinned apart,
or aṃsuk, is highlighted in the following verse.
Allātān yaridānṣā dū nālātān kuṣalāmīti. Ubaye nīvaso tādī rukangva upanivaktati.
Suppose I got it well and good. Suppose I didn't get, that's fine too.
In both circumstances, he is such, and comes back like one who walks up to a tree.
I received something that is good. I received nothing that is fine.
In both situations remaining impartial, he returns to the tree itself.
I think the reference to the tree just means the place where they go to meditate.
This kind of adaptability and resilience is also implied by the term tādī.
Though the term is sometimes rendered by the word steadfast, it does not stand for any rigidity.
Instead, it carries implications of a non-rigid resilience.
This is a wonderful quality in tathāratas and arahants.
We may compare it to a revolving swing in a children's playground.
One who is seated in a revolving swing has nothing to get upset about falling headlong
when the swing goes up. The seats are hung in such a way that they also turn with the
revolving motion of the swing. Had they been rigidly fixed, one seated there would fall off
the seat when it goes up. It is that kind of resilience that is characteristic of the
quality of tārī-tā or suchness. This is how we have to understand the famous lines in the Mahā-māṅgārasukta.
Put us a look at dhāṇhī-jitānyasana-kampadī, whose mind remains unshaken when touched by
worldly vicissitudes. Common translation, they become body. One whose mind does not shake when
touched by worldly conditions. End of comment. This quality of being unshaken, this immovability,
is the result of not grasping. It comes when there is no tenacious clinging. It is to one who
rests on or leans on something that there is dislodgement or instability. Now I am leaning on
the wall. If someone does not damage to the wall, I would get shaken. That is what is suggested by
the axiom nisitta-sachalitān, anisitta-sachalitān nāti. To one who is attached, there is dislodgement.
To the one detached, there is no dislodgement. The whirling, on the other hand, things that to lean
on or to rely on something is the mark of stability. So it seems that the term tādī has
an extraordinary dimension of meaning. In this particular context, however, the suchness spoken
of does not concern the eight worldly vicissitudes like gain and loss. Here it carries a special
nuance, as is evident from the statement, itiko bhikāve tātārato, ditta, sūta, mūta, vinyā,
tāpvesu, dhammesu, tāri yevatāri. Thus, amongst the tātārata being such in regard to all phenomena,
seen, heard, sensed and cognized, is such. Common translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi.
Thus, Bhikkhu is being ever stable among things seen, heard, sensed and cognized,
the tātārata is a stable one. End of comment.
The suchness he amends is about the views adhered to by the whirlings.
In regard to things seen, heard, sensed and cognized, the whirlings go on asserting
dogmatically, idameva satchan, morganganyan. This alone is true, all else is false.
But the tātārata has no such dogmatic involvement. He only analytically exposes them for what they
are. As we try to illustrate by the simile of the dog on the plank, the tātārata simply penetrates
into the dependently arisen nature and declares that all those views are dependent on contact,
passapachaya. That is the tādhi quality meant here. If we are to understand the plane of
suchness, tādhi bhūmi, in a deeper sense, this is how we have to appreciate its significance.
Now we come to the couplet forming the grand final to the kālaka rāmasūtan.
kālaka rāmasūtan, nāteśu tādhi saya sāmūteśu, satchang savāpi pāranda hi yam.
Common giving the translation by a bhikkhu bodhi of the pad, what the Venable
only gives the pāri. Amid those who are self-constrained, the stable one would not posit
as categorically true or false anything seen, heard or sensed, clung to and considered truth
by others. Since they have already seen this dart to which people cling at a hare, saying,
I know, I see, it is just so, the tatāgata's cling to nothing. End of comment.
In the first verse, we have the difficult term saya sāmūteśu, which we rendered by amidst those
who are entrenched in their own views. The term carries insinuations of philosophical inbreeding,
which often accounts for dogmatic adherence to viewers. The tatāgata declares that he does not
hold as true or false any of the concepts of individual truths based on what is seen,
heard, sensed and cognized by others because of his suchness. Being such, he does not categorically
label any of those views as true or false. He penetrates into and analyzes the psychological
background of all those dogmatic views and understands them as such. In the final verse,
he declares that he has seen, well into advance, the barb on which mankind is hooked, impaled.
The barb is none other than the dogmatic assertion, I know, I see, it is very so.
Having seen this barb well in advance, the tatāgata entertains no dogmatic
involvement of that sort. The precise meaning of some words and phrases here is a matter of
controversy. A discussion of them might throw more light on the deeper nuances. The most difficult
term seems to be saya sāmūteśu. The commentary gives the following explanation.
Sāya sāmūteśu Ṭṭhi, saya meva, saṁ vārīdvā, pīyāitvā, gaita gāṇīsu, diti gatikeśu Ṭṭhi ātau,
diti gatikāhi saiyang sāmūta Ṭhi bhūchanti. Sāya sāmūteśu means among those dogmatic
view holders who have grasped those views, having recollected them and cherished them.
Dogmatic view holders are called saya sāmūta. According to the commentary, the term
saya sāmūta refers to persons who hold dogmatic views,
but we interpreted it as a reference to such views themselves.
By way of clarification, we may allude to some discourses in the Ataka-bhanga of the suttani
pārtha, which bring up a wealth of material to substantiate the salient points in the kālaka
rāma-suttā, while throwing more light on the particular term in question. The chapter called
Ataka-bhanga in the suttani pārtha in particular embodies the deep analysis of the controversies of
contemporary dogmatists. Let us first of all take up for comments some verses that throw
more light on the meaning of the term saya sāmūta from the Chula-bhiuha suttā,
that discourses and folds itself in the form of question and answer. The commentary explains
that this medium of dialogue was adopted by the Buddha to resolve the clash of philosophical mood
points currently in the society, and that the interlocutor is a replica of the Buddha himself
created by his psychic power. Be that as it may, the relevant question for the present
context is presented as follows.
Why do they proclaim various truths claiming to be experts each in his field?
Are there several and various truths or do they merely follow logical consistency?
But why do they assert diverse truths those proponents who claim to be skilled?
Are those truths actually many and diverse or do they follow a line of reasoning?
The Buddha's reply to it is as follows.
There are no several and various truths that are permanent in the world,
apart from perception. It is by manipulating logic in speculative views
that they speak of two things called truth and falsehood.
Common translation by Ibi Kuboni. Truth surely are not many and diverse, except by mistakenly
perceiving permanent things in the world. But having formulated reasoning about views,
they assert the diet true and false. End of comment.
There is no plurality in the concept of truths, apart from the perception based on which they
declare various speculative views. It seems that the Buddha grants the possibility of various
level of perception as a truth for all times, though he does not accept the plurality of
truths, rising out of a variety of speculative views based on them. He understands the psychology
of logic, having seen penetratively the perceptual background of each and every view. He accepts as
a psychological fact that such and such a perception could precipitate such and such a view.
Therefore, in a limited and relative sense, they are true. The dichotomy between truth and falsehood
has arisen in the world due to a manipulation of logic on individual viewpoints. This fact
comes up for further comment in the Maha view Harsukta that follows.
Common translation by Ibi Kuboni.
If one is inferior when disparaged by an opponent, no one would be distinguished
among the teachings. For they each say the other's teaching is inferior, while firmly advocating their
own. End of comment. This verse describes how debating parties go on clashing with each other.
They call their own system of thought perfect and the other system of thought inferior.
Last a quarrel and dispute. Their own individual viewpoint they assert as true.
The phrase sakang sakang samut in each his own viewpoint is somewhat suggestive of
saya sanbudheso, the programmatic term in the kalaka rana sutta. Yet another verse from the
pasore sutta indyateka wagam exposes the biases and prejudices underlying these individual truths.
Here in the system is purity, they assert polemically. They are not prepared to grant purity
in other systems of thought. Whatever viewer they lean on that they speak and praise of,
they are severely entrenched in their own individual truths. Common translation by Ibi Kuboni.
Here alone is purity and they declare. They say there is no purification in other teachings.
Declaring whatever they depend on to be excellent, many are entrenched in separate truths. End of
comment. The last line is particularly relevant as it brings up the concept of pañceka satcha.
To be a pañceka buddha means to be enlightened for oneself.
So the term pañceka satcha can mean truth for oneself.
Those who hold conflicting views go on debating and trench teach in his own concept of truth.
Common, yeah, this is another additional reading just for those of us who want to follow up a little
bit more the idea of pañceka and in support of the interpretation proposed by Venu and Yanananda.
This is an article I originally wrote on Isigiri sutta which is now found in my collected studies
in the Ekotarika Agama studies which I will be making available. And there I discuss the
different interpretations proposed of pañceka and for those who are
still willing to follow it up further in a subsequent chapter in that same book Ekotarika
Agama studies. In the study of the jinnu sutta I take up an Ekotarika Agama discourse
that brings in the pañceka buddha and in general the pañceka buddha is very prominent in the
Ekotarika Agama of the early Buddhist discourses. And since the Ekotarika Agama is somewhat later,
well let me phrase this differently as it reflects a broader time frame than the other
early discourse collections. If we say the pañcek discourses in the Chinese Agamas might be
reflecting say the first two centuries very roughly speaking in the development of Buddhist thought
the Ekotarika Agama would get another one or two additional centuries in terms of reflecting
development. So at times Ekotarika Agama discourses can be very early but there's also
substantially later material. And the prominence of the pañceka buddha in these discourses has
led me to some speculations on the significance of this idea of pañceka buddhas which seem to
become very prominent at a time probably soon after the buddha's passing away and then
eventually again lose importance being supplanted then by the bodhisattva idea.
So just for those of you who are curious about that to just read my ideas on that not to be taken
as a statement of truth just a little bit of reflections and ideas that I have developed
in relation to the idea of the motive of the pañceka buddha. End of comment.
The three expressions pañceka sacha, sakang sakang samutting and saya samuthesu convey more or less
the same idea. The words tesu, saya samuthesu refer to those narrow viewpoints to which they
are individually confined or remain closeted in. The tatagata does not hold as true or false
any of those views limited by their self-bias. Another lapse in the commentary to the kalaka
rama sutte is its comments on the phrase parang dahayam. It takes the word parang in the sense
of supreme uttamang katva whereas in this context it means the other. Here too we may count on the
following two lines of the chula-bioha sutta of the sutta-nipata in support of our interpretation.
That by which one dubs the other fool by that it serve one cause oneself an expert.
Comment here's picobodhi's translation. As he considers the opponent a fool on the same ground
he describes himself as skilled. End of comment. From this it is clear that the phrase parang dahayati
means dubs another. The last two lines of the kalaka rama sutta of utmost importance.
I know I see it is verily so. No such clinging for the tatagatas.
Worldlings dogmatically grasp the data heaped up by their sixth sense spaces
but the tatagatas have no such entanglements in regard to sensory knowledge. Why so? It is because
they have seen the cessation of the sixth sense spaces. By way of illustration we may compare this
seeing of the cessation of the sixth sense spaces to an exposure of the inner mechanism
of a high speed engine by removing the bonnet. In the dvayasutta from which we quoted in our last
son the Buddha showed us the functioning of the kayakantic machine called the sixfold sense space.
Its vibrations, revolutions, beats, and running gears. The discourse analyzes the mechanism in
such words as
eyes impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Forms are impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise.
Thus this diet is unstable, reminiscent, impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise.
The discourse proceeds in this vein and concludes with the words
This things too are unstable, evanescent, impermanent, changing, and becoming otherwise.
Comment translation by a bigger body. Contacted because one feels, contacted one intends,
contacted one perceives. Thus these things too are moving and tottering, impermanent, changing,
becoming otherwise. End of comment. And the concluding reference is to the products of
the sixth sense spaces. Feelings, intentions, and perceptions arising due to contact
are also unstable, evanescent, impermanent, changing, and becoming otherwise.
The samtaut law of percepts is indicated by the words
The totality of percepts are made up or prepared, sankhata. The term sankhata has nuances suggestive
of production. If we take the sixfold sense space as a high speed machine, productive of perceptions,
the Buddha has revealed to us the workings of its intricate machinery. Each and every
part of this machine is unstable, evanescent, impermanent, changing, and becoming otherwise.
The Buddha understood the made up or prepared nature, sankhata, of all these,
as well as the preparations sankhava that go into it. That is why the Buddha has no
dogmatic involvement in regard to the products of this machine. The totality of all what is seen,
heard, sensed, and cognized, dicta, sutta, motta, vignata. None of them is substantial.
They are essenceless and insubstantial. There is nothing worthwhile grasping here
as apart from the activities or preparations that are dynamic in themselves.
So far we have tried to understand the state of affairs with reference to this discourse.
But now let us take up a canonical simile that facilitates our understanding.
The Buddha has compared consciousness to a magic show in the pena-pindupamasutta of the khanda-samyutta,
we already said it. Pena-pindupamangrupam, vidana-bopumbulupamma,
marechekupamma sanya, sankhara karalupamma, maiyupamancha vinyanam, dipidaricha banyamma.
Form is like a mass of foam and feeling but an airy bubble. Perception is like a mibhaj,
and formation a banana trunk. Consciousness is a magic show, a juggler's trick entire.
All these similes were made known by the kinsmen of the sun.
Common translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi. Form is like a lump of foam, feeling like a water bubble.
Perception is like a mirage, volition is like a plantain trunk, and consciousness is like an
illusion, so explain the kinsmen of the sun. And here in my translation of the samyukta-argama
parallel, contemplate bodily form as a mass of foam, feelings like bubbles on water,
perception like a glare in springtime, formations like a plantain, and the nature of any
consciousness like a magical illusion, as the kinsmen of the sun has explained. End of comment.
As a matter of fact, the verse itself is a mnemonic summary of a certain sermon delivered
by the Buddha. According to it, the Buddha, the kinsmen of the sun, has compared form to a mass
of foam, feeling to a water bubble, perception to a mirage, preparations to a banana trunk,
and consciousness to a magic show. What is of relevance to us here is the comparison of
consciousness to a magic show. The simile of the magic show is presented in that sutta in the
following words.
Suppose monks, a magician or a magician's apprentice should hold a magic show at the
four crossroads, and a king-sided man should see it, ponder over it, and reflect on it radically.
Even as he sees it, ponder over it, and reflects on it radically, he would find it empty,
he would find it hollow, he would find it void of essence. What essence monks could there be in
a magic show? Even so, amongst whatever consciousness, be it past, future, or present,
in oneself or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near,
a monk sees it, ponder over it, and reflect on it radically. And even as he sees it, ponder over it,
and reflect on it radically, he finds it empty, he finds it hollow, he finds it void of essence.
What essence monks could there be in a consciousness? Common translation by Bhikkhumori.
Suppose because that a magician or a magician's apprentice would display a magical illusion at
a crossroads. A man with good sight would inspect it, ponder it, and carefully investigate it,
and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be
in a magical illusion? So too, because whatever kind of consciousness there is, whether past,
future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near,
a bhikkhu inspects it, ponders it, and carefully investigates it, and it would appear to him to be
void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in consciousness? And samyatagana,
parallel. Moms it is just as if a master magician or the disciple of a master magician
at a crossroads creates the magical illusion of an elephant troop, a horse troop, a chariot troop,
and an infantry troop. And a wise and clear-sighted person carefully examines, attends to, and analyzes
it. At the time of carefully examining, attending to, and analyzing it, he finds that there is nothing
in it. Nothing stable, nothing substantial, it has no solidity. Why is that? It is because there is
nothing solid or substantial in a magical illusion. In the same way, among carefully examines, attends
to, and analyzes, whatever consciousness, past, future, or present, internal or external,
gross or subtle, sublime or repugnant, far or near. When carefully examining, attending to, and
analyzing it, the mom finds that there is nothing in it. Nothing stable, nothing substantial, it has
no solidity. It is like a disease, like a carbuncle, like a thorn, like a killer. It is impermanent,
nuka, empty, and not self. Why is that? It is because there is nothing solid or substantial
in consciousness. Thank you very much for your attention.