So, I do want to try out somethings on you
that are typically not with a full us where sciences
most come for the bull and addiers.
Welcome we say about the things, that we don't have direct access to.
I've talked about data, hype talked about those.
But I want to talk about the furnamen are that are beyond, the data.
And we for those of view you who would here was
a erste today are get data, I carry mother.
Yes, yes, today. I'm going to be developing
so my dears off of some of the work up boogin
and would word that I,
we free too be out bring it all back in
for those of you could more.
Yes, today
But when I want to do today, is to suggest that this
frameworker thinking about science that I been working on, making clear of perspect typle integrative pragmatic pluralism.
Should say something about the issues about what is actually in nature,
nämlich that I would call the matterphysics of nature,
what do we on the basis of these multiple,
perspect typle in integrative representations in practices,
can we say about what is,
what can we say as humans about what is in nature?
So, again, I want to lean a little bit,
since we varieties some of a surverity seen this is week on the destinctions,
that bogan and would word make about data in phenomena.
And let us time my talk, yes,
today talk about the data part of the story,
but this time one of focus on the phenomena.
And that is a post to be
on their count
To be what sciento big series product and explain our facts
about phänomenal the things at our actually in the world.
And that phänomenal are detect that through the use of data,
but then most cases are not abserverable in any interesting sense of that term.
So the phänomenal, what we think is
being cosely and directed with in some experimental setup,
that allows as two detect through the experiment data.
And that, if our data,
if our detection are experimental detection devices reliable,
then the signals of the features of the phänomenal that,
we are engaging in the experiment
Causally interacted with and are loud to then be measured
and represended as a model of the data.
So the datas, what we have that's what we can
at the risk the end productive an experimental
detection ineraction and the assumption is that that there's something where are the acting with,
right, that's the phänomenal and that's what the series of science are supposed to be explaining,
there's post speaks branding, what's in the world more to doing?
So in the case is I been looking at
this week
Or some of them, it's been on what is infact,
the structure of a particular protein, that's the phanamena,
and we have different experimental ways of engaging with that and
we have theories about their structure and how the structure effects the function.
So what are for namena, then for boogan in wood word,
is that they have there things, that are to beserverable,
that have stable, repeatable characteristics, which will be detected,
by means of a variety, of a different procedures,
which may year quite different kinds of data.
So here's a lotsky matic which I've barout from someone who
barout it from Daniel or by low joins,
book on models
Of the buggin, word word picture.
And in the middle you have the phänomen on,
which is missbelled, but anyway, the phänomen on,
which is then generating or responsible lancing does,
we interpret that causally, cause what does,
would you do in an experiment as a part except causally in a rap with the phänomen on?
And then the data, it gets analyzed,
and can be used to test different theoretical models,
that are other vernamen on.
But art, in themselves explaining, that data,
that's the bogin would word picture
Data, give us, evidence of the existence empropertues of phenomena,
that the Theories explain. But what I the phonamenough, what's real?
That's the matter physical question. So in some sense,
what we see, yes, there, I think,
is that a bear, will call it a bear.
I guess this as different theories of what ideas.
But let's call it a bear, which is the data. And the question is,
what's generating this shadow, this very platonic,
and now this generating the shadow of a bear,
what's the phonomena that that's the real thing with the shadow is about to be just.
The signature marks of the phänomena, that are detaptable by us.
And I want to city, I want to,
I'm trying to develop a fairly radical viewcare.
So, I'm sure you lead there help me are,
help me through your critical comments to the händ of this.
But there's kind of two standard ways of doing matterphysics from
science. And I barrel this distinction from unto and chakravady,
all the way don't follow the road he follows in in the go shading them,
but and of course, metiphysics is huge feel.
So I just want to cut the territory crew they to show,
what I think is run with all of it. The
to show to make space for what I want to defend.
And so took a very sick just,
that there's two major fundamentalists approaches to metiphysics coming from Science.
And one is a bottom up approach and the other is
a top down approach. And the bottom up approach tics
corsization as as the foundation of positing, what's real.
So if I want to know
it's real
I'm going to used in yourshing of causation as the foundation for,
what is in the world, that's unabserverable, that's independent about,
as the root to determining what is the real.
So real for namen are entities, that cause our experience.
And that generate data in different settings. So this is
very comfortable with the book and wood word view.
And we in fore, what the fornamen are are a
fron our experience from the causal in your actions, right?
So it's of every imperious sist view.
So are causal ineractions
with the nature
There to experience to experiment. Those that's what gives us
the ground, what is really in nature,
is what is causing us to have those experiences.
I mean, I flip between slides for man it.
One in example of this view and there our others,
is in the nature card right.
Who posits, who suggest that, what's really real,
are a causal capacities in the world. Nämlich capacities,
she claims are are assource, a stable causal,
law, and causal law,
so just any the causal laws that generate data words
That are detectable, if you like,
and in from book, from art cosely eneractions.
So when you say, this experiment measures has these measurements
of some property your inneraction, that I'm examining.
The she would say that the reason you getting these measurements
is because there are entities in the world,
that have the capacity to generate those signals.
Okay. And that it's really cosely capacities is that that's
all that's really real and everything about that is our
constructions on top of that
The other main approach in contemporary for luss to if science
and mattiphysics is a structural, up structural realist approach.
So once and entity real is approach, once a structural realist approach.
And this is that, what's really real,
what science discovers about nature, isn't the entities,
which have cause al capacities, but are the structural relations,
those are the foundation of what's really real.
And real for namen out then for therefore in this position,
are of structures that are eyes you murphic to the matt
matt correlations in our best
So now, you want to do,
if we want to use your science to figure out,
what the matterphysics, the empology of the world is, what's out there?
You should in further, what the further namen out with
you now relations or structures, from our theories.
And done, well, I was an early developer,
oh, there's now a lot more structural realist in the community,
talking about the stuff.
And he said, on the structural realist view,
what newton really discovered other relationships between phänomena express in math madical equasions of his theory.
So we're,
we're there's a huge debate in the letter to your see
our going with french and lady men who are the current
structural of realists and the structural realists arguing with all the entity realists about what's really real,
what's the fundamental?
Character of nature that are science,
if you like enables as to project on to the world.
And my response to this is, why can't they both
be right? Why do I have to pick one?
And so the view like like to be developed at that
I'm developing is one that's pragmatic.
And non fundamental, there's not just,
it's not just tentities and it's not
your structures
So if I'm not telling you what ideas, what can
I say about it? If I'm not telling you,
it's not just distruction is not just inentody.
What I want to be able to do is too to
articulate a matiphysical position, that's Dinner, then eater of those,
that's a finish you can go.
That posits only what we need in order two makes sense
of our experiences in the successive our scientive ic theories.
So this is a non-fundamentalist, merphysics,
it's pluralist in perspect typle.
And what I suggest
is that real phanamena
Are those things in the world,
that are seufficiently stable to a 4 detection in representation.
And so that's very, very thing. So what I mean, by a ford. A fordance is,
I'm inspired by the work of an ecological psychologist,
of the 20 its Century, nämlich J.J. Gibson,
who was you do he event to this term of fordance for a different purpose,
but I think, I'm want to expand the purpose he is,
it for this one.
So what J.J. Gibson said is that a fordances are properties,
taken with reference to
the abserver
And for the more, that the effortence is of the environment.
So he was interested and what the world was for the various
animal soupsychology and behavior, he was trying to explain.
The effortences of the environment are what it others, the animal,
what it provides or furnitures eather for good or ill.
The verb to a 4 this found in the detectuary,
but the nown of fortence is not, I have made it up.
I J.J. Gibson. I mean,
by it something that refers to bothy environment and the
animal in a way that know existing term does,
in emplies,
the complementarity of the animal
and the environment
So, substituted for animal scientist. Substituted for environment,
the way the world is. And what I would like
to suggest is, there's no fixe tantology of enthodys
or fixe tantology of structures. But rather,
what we project, back ass being constructive of our nature
is content on this completely many relationship between,
what we can The termin in detect and what nature offorts for us.
Okay. So nature is independent of us. Right,
we can have be, you know. And may sun be,
if we don't fix global worming, I know.
So they want before are really this wick.
But the planet has existed in the Universal existed priority humans.
And probably will post human life, it like this to pirate any life.
And so when we talk about method office ex for me,
what we're talking betters,
what we
as humans
Limited beings, right, what we are humans can say,
about what natures like that's independent of us.
And all we can say, just a fiably,
is a combination of what we can say and what nature offorts,
I provides for us, as to detectable and alizable thinkable. So,
it's not a fixed anthology, it's a content one,
it's can tingen on, us,
and content on the character of the world, but it's,
it we it turns out that we can Fine stable,
Features, that we can characterize as entities with dispositional properlys,
with causal properties, that we engaged with in experimental in their action,
and we can also find stable relations in the structures of our best theory.
So it's strikes me that the stability can cover,
both of the so stability is that is the features that nature of forwards,
if they were know stable properties or relations and nature,
they would be
no science
It's strikes been those at the männer more conditions for doing science,
that they has been some structure order in nature for us to detect in news.
And that's, I think, all we need to say.
So one of their ways to try to figure out of this,
this view is to see whether not,
what I take to be challenges for at the bogen in wordword view or sad us by by my.
So this is going to be a solution impart to the challenges,
to there, view, about what the relations are among stability.
They're grease of in Variance, in reliability.
Siss me
So bogan and word word just two minders, that claim
that for namen out. So we both one in a what's.
For namen outs just standing for what's in the world.
Okay. And then we want to say,
what more about it, then there's just something out there.
For namen out detected through the use of data by the most case is are unabservable.
And that phenomen are have stable, repeatable, characteristics,
which will be detectable, by means over variedy, af different procedures.
So they think that in the phenomenal stability in conjunction with reliable detectors,
well, intered will guilt convergent datas. Because I think,
and this is at not an uncommon argument that arguments for realism, expect from experiment,
often are developed on the basis that we have all these different ways,
of detecting something that we think is in nature,
right, we have different experiments completely worldly different experiments.
And with they all come up with the same and so,
what are we think, we're untust,
we captured something that's really there?
You can't be, it's not depending on the particular experiment.
So it must be what is shared a monked stall these different preceivers.
So experimental convergence is one of the arguments that,
no, that's fairly comment for realism.
And part of what I wanted to in this talk,
is just that divirgin data is also, can also be evidence of realism.
So if you take convergent data, I know, it's weird.
If you take convergent data is the only create to you for realism,
you end up in their position and I want to say
just that
It's not infact that way. So one of the things
has to be will, how do why deep deep decipher?
How do why determine, when I doing experiment,
and I deep takes something, that I'm going to call stable feature.
How do I makes sense of that interms of it's reliability
and the carsal relationship of the phänomenout to the data?
So I think for four experiments to give us eliability and
the carsal relationship of the phänomenout things,
something about the vernamenout that is in job serverable by directly
We have to a summ that there's a causal ineraction,
between the phänomena and the results of our experience in
the results of our experience to generate the data.
So it's all got to be about, that part has
to because it. And the turns out Gym,
what words his developed in a labor it.
Theory of what it is two, how explain a calls
of relationship. And that's it theory about invariance underevention.
And I want to say just that if you take his developed,
and what you dist to be our cause in try to make
sense of what he says about phänomen and data things go wrong.
Ortlys new questions are raised that need to
be answer
So he's a just that are cars and this is just his standard definition.
See cars is eas. I think for namen and cars is
the did the signals that are detected and turn and didata.
If there is some intervention, if and only if,
there is some intervention that change is the value see,
such that, if that innovation venture word,
a car, the value of e or the probably
distribution of e would change
So, all das meiste, you don't need to way,
but all the formal this has attack to huge formal apparent
us and based thats and all sorts of things.
But all you need to know, this is just kind,
basically the kind of mills, mathod nation of causation, right?
So if I have a cause. And I think,
it's responsible for the effect, it means that if I
create conditions, where I remove this allege cast,
that be a change at the effect.
Okay, if I in a ween on the cause,
there should be a change in the effect.
And of there is in the change in the effect,
then not the covers. I mean that's the simple list
version, there's all intervening very volsing from founders.
So explaination, he thinks is all you need for something to be
a course, is that relation between CNE is in Variant.
And there's some of the changes of the value of CE or background conditions.
It doesn't have to be universal. So part of that
lecture on last, if you were here for that,
was two suggest that you didn't need.
Universality to get lawfulness, to get explainatory,
Knowledge of stable relations,
you could have them with in certain rangers and for certain
circumstances and that would still give you evidence and appeal to corsation.
So corsation doesn't have to be universal. Doesn't have to
be that see in your in variant under every single
placible change in condition value of the variable or condition of the context. So the example,
we talked about then was a simple one all those there
more complicating one of the idea gasla, with holds,
the relationship between pressure, valiment,
temperature,
holds for almost all values of temperature except except
extreme ones
Für alle Values appressure accept for the extreme ones in then that relationship fails.
But it's still we can explain what happens in the range
of in Variance where it holds as a cause all relationship between.
This is actually not a great example cause it's a kind of
equal libery im Theory. But the never the less,
I could use to different example, I really.
But nevertheless that show is you the rain.
That's a good when for showing the range of conditions and
the which it holds and for for wood word,
his theory of cars of a explanations,
that's all you need
For you do have a cause all explaination,
there has to be a range and the which if you weekle
see ewell change. But not university. So it turns
out that expexplaination carsal, explaination by in Varians,
requires that under only under some changes that the relation discript is in Varians.
For it to because. So now I'm want to read
that back into the phänomenal causes, the data surely hand.
And bogan it would would say that data is evidence for phänomenal.
And I wouldn't interpret that us,
if experiement is reliable than the phänomenal in the experimental setup,
cause is the effects recorded is vader
It's fully straightforward. I think there's a beening queable about that.
If it's reliable, then what you're detecting that signal correctly
from the vernamen on that you'ves introding to experiment.
And if you, if you're,
if either you're rang that there isn't something out there,
that's giving you the signal or you're unreligiably detecting that,
you know, can get the correct relationship between fordamena data.
Realism of the phänomena influence. Okay. Right.
So the question becomes, what is the relationship between the
reliarliability of the experiment and the in Variance of the
cosel explanation
And I want to just that they, they're easy cases in heart cases.
They developed their account on the easy case and I'm going to give them,
what I think a heart cases, which make this relationship,
between reliability, in Variance and for namen all realism,
more complicated.
So they take the easy case, what's the melting point of let?
Okay, so it's. They think they're a Theories,
the furnamen on in the world is that let
melds at 3070 to gree selfies. That's really what let
is doing. Okay, that's
the realism part
And they think the data, when you consely unerected with led.
The data is a whole ranger of measurements. And you that now any,
it maybe the case that when you take all your measurements with your third moment
or whatever you did detect to device is.
None of them history 107 to greensalcies. And yet,
because you get our range of readings you can do
data analysis sonne, which is what we always do.
And you're take the mean Value vollow of these emissions.
And if the mean Value is 300,
I think it's actually 327.5, but they say 3227 their paper,
if it's the mean value of the measurements is 327 to greens,
selfies, plus our minders, oh point one degrees,
selfies.
You take that as a reliable indication of the phänomenal property,
that your extesting for, okay.
And that's a pretty, it they think
Theories is melacular Theories in Chemical Theories
Can can explain why it has that temperature that
melting point right and can predict what it would be.
But the experiment is, what's causally enracting with the lad
to provide support for a theory about the vernamen on by through
this intervening data step that they argue for. Now,
there are questions about what there the data concident to reliable
evidence for something namens, they climb, this is a quote.
The questions about what they're data concident reliable evidence for something namens
at turns on such conciderations as where there the data are replicable.
These conciderations are distinct from concern with explaination.
And what they mean again
Is that there is explained facts about phänomenal that Theories are
about let it? They're not explaining facts about the data.
The data is reliability isn't on whether gives you that answer
the Theory one that would be pretty back,
because we want we want the experiments that we have some independence from the various sterious that they're testing.
Are the wise,
if we only say the Theories is reliable one it gives
you think answer you want that you're theory projects that would
be probably matic for the role that we think experiment place
in scientific in the episthemic practices of scientists
So then, you know, every different theory with have it sound data.
I mean, this probably, I mean, happens.
Sometimes, but we think it's not a good thing.
We think data should be new troll, if you like,
between competent theorys. And there for they want to suggest,
that what you, what determines are large ability?
They think say it's replicability and that's, of course,
a big black bucks and we talk to lil yesterday,
but the kinds of steps, if you break
down into more reflect, every find it.
Description of the experiment, you can see,
we're the different, the radical sumptions coming and generating
the cosel
To action and the detection of the data and the refinement of the data.
And they're going to be Theories, that just not going to be that Theories your testing.
You can't make that Theorie your testing be the arbiture of reliability or it fails to be independent. So,
it seems to work pretty well with let,
because you do all these different experience or the charge on electron,
which is a famous historical case,
we have all these different ways of detecting,
what this value is, and when they all a gree,
right, the convergence of the stata,
gives you evidence for the realism of da vernahmen ein,
nämlich dem melting point of that is 327 to go selfies.
Okay. So converting data from multiple experiments with a independent of
the Theory undertast are grounds for realism about the phanamena.
That's the story. This is not another this should be
well understand. Okay. So that's make it a little harder.
I think there are hard cases. For this view.
And then has to do with what whether there are either
new kinds of phanamena or what these new kinds of phanamena might
do to disrupt that picture that I just paid it,
about reliability and phanamena and data.
And that's the question about embody gent for namena.
That embirgences had a checkered history in science when out of fashion for well,
came back with the vengine Vengeance in Bart 1970 in Terms of Sciento, appeals to emergence.
I've retten a lot about emergence and I don't want I
tell you all of those interesting things, about emergence,
accept to artikely certain features of it that I think challenge
or it least require further a laboration of the story or in the bogin and wood wordpaper.
And that is that here some definitions of emergines,
emergines is defined us alrizing of mergines and co-heard structure the
arrising of nabel in co-heard structures, patterns and properties,
storying the process of process of organization in progress us in complete systems.
Emergence is that is the concept of an emergin phänomen.
So it is is a new kind of phänomen and emergent
phänomen.
What is it
Is a large scale group, behavior of a system,
which doesn't seem to have any clear explanation in
terms of the systems constituent arts.
And immergence is also characterize as a dynamic organization,
that emergence from the collector, behave
europe agency individual properties. Of which can out the count
for the properties of the final dynamic pattern.
So basically, what these are all referring too?
Are highly, are highly, are highly,
are our properties of in properties of complex systems
Who stability is maintained in a dynamic process to the inneraction of the temponent parts.
So you know, we got stabilities stabilities,
what we look at that this signature of the real right.
And we have stability at a higher level. So here's
some examples of that. We are the saw this one
and early electure, we we have in transically dissordued proteins.
Namely, in this example, sorry,
of to gets my what, you guys,
I'm loose and my voice from all the stock it
Here we have a feature other protein,
that is a property of the protein as a whole and
not drivable from the properties, of it's component and minor assets.
It's a property that it lows it to be the part of it,
the linker to be flexible, which increases, it's probability,
of successfully in the binding with a peace of the that their malical in the sell,
which is required mine with to be functional.
Okay, so this is a particular one you don't need
to know.
About them
The Carry at specific me liquidare functions, but to do it,
they are required to have this higher level structure.
No, turns out that this is unique to a particular protein,
but there's classes aproteins, that have these higher level scale,
higher scale, properties.
And they are made up of different in me now assets.
So it's not that they mean,
it was also string that characterize is that protein,
is but solve going to be able to predict which ones
to be functional need to have this higher order flexible linker.
So Plexibility is not a property of they mean our assets.
It's a flag, it's a probably of the whole structure.
Similarly, there's a lot of contact sensitive emergine,
if you like 30 energy interaktions. So this is again,
what I want to do is strateg character, I something,
I would called Dynamics tability, that it's a stability that our rises.
It's a higher order through the enraction of the components
of the system. This is a complicated side,
but I mean just say that this is just,
and characterizing the general categorie of eppy phänomenet,
eppy phänomenet at sorry
epiginetic mechanisms
And a bituenetics, so in biology, again,
this more reductive strategy,
what's a really real or the jeans,
what has all the causal ompfed to get all of the prop,
the trades and properties and behaviors of the organizing setter made
up of Jeans is to be explained just interms of the Jeans and at turns out,
that there are many properties.
And there are going to get weird. So bere with me,
there are many properties of organizms,
for which having or not having a particular gene,
is in soufficient for determining weather not they have the property
Is ability of the property if you like is not dependent
on the stability of the Gene,
but rather is the result of the inneraction of the Gene,
with various other apply-ginetic outside of the Gene features of the system.
So there's mathelation group, switcher epaginetic factors found in the
diatery sources, that activate and repress Jeans.
So geneser regulated. And so just having the General not
have in the Gene, the kind of anthody picture,
the Jeans on gonna be the cause of anything,
except if
they express
There, if they produce, that's they inneract with the arenator produce the proteins.
My but this skin of a protein week. So Jeans
are would codes for a proteins. And if you have
a particular jean, it codes for a predictive approtein, right?
But only if, it in a recs with the right
things in the environment, just like the flexible linker.
I love me give you a lot, it more
tangible and a musicing example of apply genetics.
And that's turns that that social information changes the brain.
Okay. So now we think that having agine or not having gene,
provides, is part of the stable make up of an organizem,
they were that argument explain it's behavior.
But it turns up that that there are epaginated relationships,
in this is a study of secret fish,
that have a higher arguical social structure.
And it turns that that whether they have a gener not,
is can can tributes to what goes on in their brain and they're behavior.
But whether not that gene producers proteins or not,
that are the more proximal cause of
their behavior
And where they are in the social higher archie.
So social higher archie actually that environment. It's there where there
they're gene products is a rappery productive behavior and not.
It's a function of where they are in the social
higher archie. So have in the gener,
not having the gene is not on enough,
it has to inner act with, that other features in these case.
The features it has be regulated. In order two have
the office, that that gene has the potential that have.
One more example of regulation
And not is even the same or what we called the
homealogage gene in different organisms in this case,
it see elegans, just after lively and honey be,
or this, oh, epers moliforthers up there.
This is just, it's out the here see all then
sorry, see elegans, the frook fly and the honey be.
They all have a agine, the gene fore, which is controls,
what are they're going to be agree rovers or sitters.
Okay, so controls, they're emotion.
What are they have the gene
For what which variably of this jing,
they have determines whether they're the kind of organize rooms round,
or they're the kind of organize in that sits still.
And this seems to be conserved the cross-species.
So this gene has that effect in see elegans,
the namen tode, it has and you can see the
different welling and rooming has at effect that same gene,
having it are not on the... Fruitfly,
but with honey bees,
a turns out that the home a lot of that gene,
has in effect,
but only
Ihr fährt, ist also auch regulated, weil epicinedically by the social environment.
Okay, so weather and not this gene,
it results in their roaming or sitting, their foreigning orignersing,
is the function of the social environment and not just having majine.
So even the very same, if you like biocamical bit,
in den Organismen. It's can be regulated it epicinatically,
and so this stability of the relationship,
between having the gene,
and having the behavior
Is stabilized only one you bring in, these epaginatic outside the gene factors.
So it's context sensitive, that's the short hand.
So you can measure changes in expression of the Jeans,
that core late with changes in the behavior, right?
So we want to see, what's the let's store experiment,
is this gene carsing this behavior,
is having this gene carsing this behavior,
where as having at differenty in carsis the different behavior.
You do you experiment and you find that, oh, that's great.
I can measure that change is in the expression of Jeans
and they core late with the changes in behavior.
So now, I'm going to think the gene is,
the cars of the pavior of that stop stability
The D-Expression measured and brains of individuals with different behaviors,
you see that, there is, transs script namely,
it's transscribed, by the Jean, how much gene,
transscript there is, reflex, a mechanistic link between the Jean and the behavior.
So how much that gene is express, tells you,
there is there is it relinked between the Jean and behavior cause all link,
but a turns out that, how much is express,
doesn't always tell you how much protein,
which is the actual activator of the behavior,
is going to be in the brain.
Some differences in Genexpression or a consequence and not a cause
of behavioral change. So this is like the fish,
the social conditions change that this actually, also cause in us,
by the way, that the social environment changes,
the causal upshot of having agene,
or not having agene.
So that is this kind of generic causal manuels,
that have been product proposed to explain trades and behaviors,
work some times
And sometimes say down. Because they don't take if they
don't take it in count the way and watch,
there's a hire at there's a interaction, between these component parts.
It's not in variant a cross-social context changes for the be.
It is for the new method in the cross-social.
But the Jeans or not. In variant,
in those cases of emergent phänomenal. So let's turn to
the problems in more general terms.
Do these kinds of emergent phänomenal count as phänomenal on the
bogin in with word framework
I think there are real for nomina scientists or discovering there's stabilities,
but there's stabilities at that are maintain by dynamic interactions, right?
Not by the presents of absence of, if an entity,
like a chain. And in and the data in different contacts
of this kind of these cases, organ it disagree.
So if you study the jean by heavy relationship in the context of one social environment,
you going to get one rect one measurement,
and if you study didn't in a different contacts,
you're going to get a different one.
So what are we supposed to do and terms
of infrain what's real
What's the rule of the hear of the the theory other this vernamen and determine the reliability of the data?
So the way are sent, it set it up,
was that, if the phänomen on his stable,
and you have a reliable detector, then multiple experiments should converge.
And now the argue, when I'm suggesting,
as you can have stable the hear wear,
stable for namen on, relate,
but the question is, if I get diversion,
results do I have this assume that my detection devices, is unreliable,
or do I have to assume that there is no stable phänomen on.
It's not really of phonamen, I cause it doesn't
follow the rules of this picture
So reliability requires stability, but how much?
Reguile ability refers to the Technik for generating data from the from
namen our or infraining for namen of from the data.
That's what reliability is. But different technics,
I measuring melting point of let, which give the same
value support the existence of the independence of a front
namen on the realism. When is this true? And
when is in that? That's strikes me that we have
different degrees of stability in different degrees of contexts independence.
And there are going to change the when which we can da maniphysical realist influence,
from the relationship between, because the lineration and the data.
So with the top and the air own.
If we actually only had for namena in the world,
that had universal dependents namely for all active, extress a peak,
the next was a cue and they rose now exceptions to this.
And that's so my are soon that the melting point
of let is pretty much like this.
And if you have a very, very stable for namena.
So I think there's things or help to wease of stability,
right? And we can have knowledge about them
So, you have a very, very stable phänomenal.
Right. Than you would make the infrance that if I do experiments.
And I get different results, there's something wrong somewhere.
Right, there's something wrong with my experiment. If,
I think, that the phänomen at that I'm trying
to detect have this kind of stability.
All of the experiments, if there all reliable should give
me the same result. Because the phänomena is context,
insensitive. But maybe there's a lower degree of stability.
Maybe there's phänomena that don't have that
Highest level of invirience are stability. If it there only high probability,
right, that it will issue in a result,
it's a probably balistic relationship,
then the dependence between the course and the effect, the vernamena and the data,
would hold for most cases but not for all cases.
And so then if I get experimental results,
where it does hold, and I get experimental results word,
doesn't hold, I don't is a soon,
that either my experiment is on reliable or that,
the vernamen on, it's not.
Real, I just think it has this probablyistic relationship to
the generation of data.
But what about highly context dependent emergin for nominal
What about once that or cay artic. World care excellent
you. Let's what about highly context your mergin for namen.
What would constitue reliability in this case? Bogan it would
we're thought reliability restsue don't replicability. But I'm suggesting that,
if you can't replicate,
it may not be a function of your detector being on reliable,
and maybe a reflection on the character character of the vernamen,
I you're tech tacting.
If you're for namen, I is veryable. It's context that's
a typ, is dynamically stable and can be disrupted.
Dann it maybe that
Replikability in Reliability down hängende Gether. So in that case
of where you have, they have to match up that's the story.
If you have a very static fixed, contacts incensitive,
stable phänomenal, then all experiments it give you that are reliable should give you the same result.
Okay. All data processes, were all give the same Value,
like the let case. But if you have,
our weeker, relationship between the cause in Effect,
then new it's back something other than reple, you expect reple a cability,
but with respect to the probably probibibility range of the relationship between,
the cause and effect, multiple dated types will give the same value,
but maybe not all of them, cause you get different ranges,
depending, I mean, the probibibilities as you know,
are going to all be filled out in everytime you do the experiment.
So you get different once, and you going to have to decide,
which range characterizes that, now, probably listic,
if you like, our still castic-phänomen on. And if you have cares,
case is word to difficult to repeat,
and you have to use unique experiments,
Day maybe the one's require to get a measure of the Value of some extremely context dependent,
where the only get the effect,
when all of these very these newmers features right,
of the system all line-up, right, think about the evolution evolutionary,
when you run the tape again to revolution,
you're not can get
the same features all line-up to get the exact same,
to jectory of organisms.
So highly can text dependent, expert for namena,
can be
for namena
But they're not going to have the same signature in terms of multiple experiental deetection.
So reliability. The type of ralia ability,
you should expect, has to track the character of
the stability of the phänomen on your looking out.
So on this account, not everything, is like let that's the short hand.
If you think that they're complex the namen on,
which I think, we have good evidence for,
that are stabilized at higher hire level through dynamic in eneraction
Than the way in which you studio them,
may involve having breaking down that need relationship between,
there's one fix thing in nature.
I can look at it from all of these different experimental ways.
And I'm going to get the same result. And the fact
that I do, cause me it's real, right?
And that it's reliable, because I get the samer that
result every time and use this of experiment,
I get the same result.
I we time use that reuse experiment and my I
use multiple experiments, I get the same result
I've got let's down to something real, but real phänomenal feature of nature.
But in fact if if the namen at come in different
degrees of stability, then relyability has to track that.
You can't expect that kind of replicability to be the car
the signature of the real. If the kind of namen,
I's their rise this university stable, then getting a divergent data.
Sets supportsy influence that the expert,
you read the got an experimental art effect,
or it's not a really universal phänomen and the beginning with.
Okay, that's the infrance you can make,
if the phänomenist that to be have the kind of stability
right that really strong strict kind.
But if there are phänomenal, which I think there are good reason to believe.
If the phänomen on is their rised as less the Universally stable,
I more effemeral, more sensitive the variations in Kontext.
Then getting diversion data, it's consistent with all of them
detecting are real contingent for namen an.
So now the very buildy is just shifting into the client
of the namen and we compares it as being in world,
rather than any variation,
being a signature of and air
So the upshot is that relapped about reliability and closers.
So you want to say well,
the fan other closers the data, but cause in Variance,
even on what words, a comes in the grease.
You don't need universal exception listen Variance for it
to be considered a cause. That's he road,
he road a big book and lots of articles about that.
So he himself and I a gree with them,
that to be cause it doesn't have to be in Variance
a current a cross all values of the variables in all context.
So there only has to be a arrange in which it
is in Variance. For us, to think we can
we've actually detecting
a cause
And phanamilal stability, so causal inveriance comes into greens,
for namenos tability comes in the greens, current to be.
And hands the envariance or the causal relationship between the phanamen and the data, also comes
integrees. You don't need content intext, insensitivity for a lieability.
We should make that's too hard a hard a requirement.
Instead, you need make, you need the match,
the character, the reliability with the character of the stability.
So the different kinds of, if you think,
there are different kinds of phanamena, which I think, there are.
And these would would thinks are so different kinds degrees of causal stabiled,
causal invariance, then the kind of reliability test for reliability
for not for a experiments to show us,
what's real, because again, we're also suggesting.
What the point is that what can we learn from my
experiments that tausends the matterphysical part of the story?
What's evidence that we've captured a real property or a relation?
Okay. So the conclusion is that we're counclusions reliability in
the data
That is generated buyer or thing influential support for a vernamen
on is dependent on the character of the stability of the
phänomen on if there's more alers stable for namen on reliabilities
going to have a different characterization we could say that reliability
is always reliable for this kind of
phänomen on emergin for namen on dynamically stabilized phänomen on right
not reliable to core. So you if you going to
open up the door right for there to be the
grease of in Variance and the grease of castle in Variance
integrease of castle in Variance integry and the phanamen on and reliability
has to also be tuned to match those kinds of cosel
very ability and phanamenal very ability if you are fix cases universal fixed for namen I context insensitive,
then replicability is going to give you is going to give you grounds for realism.
But if you have variab in degrees of in Variance in your carsel
relation between the Phanamena and the Data and you have the
different kinds of stability in the Phanamena Than whether and now you get the same answer,
the same data our across, many kinds of experiments.
Well, has a different influential force. So there you
need some theory of the kind of fan namen,
I you're testing to specify the approbably a type of relyability for
data generation or data phänomenal influence in order to to be able to make a climate about realism.
So not every, phänomen on is like let
This is rom burging and would word, well,
the melting of the letter curse,
where never samples of letter present at the probably temperature impressure and results from a character is exchange in the crystaline structure of this medal,
the aserve value of each, their namens are reading depends,
not just on the temperature, which the let begin to mild,
but I'm very as perceptual and character effectors that work in the abserver on the various factors,
which determine the workinsel, the their mamater on the mechanisms,
by what he just transmittered from the sample, blood,
blood, blood.
And no doubt on various other sources,
a very underman system henning air as as well.
So very ations
Or not always going to be do to ear.
If you are low, that the relation between this signal and
the detector of the calls of relation has degrees a wimble rians.
And not just universal. And if you accept that the phänomen I come,
you can have stable phänomen out that are not stable in
context in variance ways.
So stability is,
it's of context sensitive
Hear we dis alone. So there is what the conclusions are,
so it's I want to, and this soon,
is that data phänomenal stability and relyability or applicald build to real structure
is which very and there degree of contexts incentive in Variance.
And in the varite of data sets, that can be access.
Some phänomenal complex immerigin phänomenal, may require a theory of
the phänomenal that do the German, what councils data,
and what canuncils reliable with respect to that data.
For booking in mood word, reliable convergent data, is what counts,
where kind of data or evidence for a real phanaman,
if we want to say now, what's real,
and the namen directly abserve,
we want to try to give as kive grounds for when we can say,
this experiment, these multiple experiments, now show me,
I have a real phanaman on.
And other wants show me, I don't. Okay,
that they eater, there's not a real phanaman on,
can it's not got the right kind of stability,
or right made a my stick and I'm not getting the data is not reliable.
So I want to say, when you have a reliable
data from over real phanaman an, You may get different.
Answers, you may have divergent data and that word intel
that you don't have a real phänomen.
So bogin and word word say, in order to have
evidence of a real phänomen and you have have a real liable convergent data.
Reliabilities independent of theories of the phänomen and it's only informed
by theories of the experiment.
And we talked about why that's important. And that divergent
data are grounds for thinking there's eat there know for nowmen
on being detected or there's an art effect of the experiment,
why there's something wrong,
there's in a stage
For on my view, you can have with liable conversion, or divergent data.
Divirgent data by it, so doesn't tell you,
you have an artifact, or that you have no phonormen
on. The virging can be do to different perspect typle party eality,
or can be do to the dynamic contact sensitive character of the phonormen on.
The standards for a liability you're going to be relative to the kind of phonormen
our worst standing. So just to remind you of the
perspect typle part Since different experiments, detect feature, different features of the phänomena.
I want to be able to say that they both get the structure,
the top, this wins from exrecure to logofy,
this wins from nuked their magnetic residence,
both of those,
the models that and for the data they get and the models or they've are infered
or all absolutely correct. They didn't make I'm a stake.
Nothing, they did was raw on. Okay. But
because of their party alidy, they can't can detect all
of the information that gives you the model of the protein.
And so we have ways of massage.
But it's not costs one of you say, oh,
these experiments that this sensor.
This experiment get it different answer, one of woms wrong.
That's not, what you that's the wrong.
That's a mystic in Influence. There both right.
But there both partial in different ways. And the other
when which divergent experimental results,
I can also be correct and capture the phänamena correctly
is when there's different types of stability in the phänomena
And that is the case, the difference between led and
the flexible linker. So I think that even though,
if you test to the flexible linker, it different times,
you get different data, it's not because you've got,
you've made am a stick.
So the conclusion is in defensive a continued matiphisics that real phonomen our,
only have to be suggeficiently stable, not universally stable,
not crawl text in sensitive, high,
to a 4 detection,
by baltible
percial perspect typle,
detection devices
And beable in representation. And so different types of phone
namen on populatory universe, different types of stability characterize,
that those phone namen and either static,
like learn the building part of let or dynamic,
like the but relation between Jeans and behavior.
And different types of rely ability or then going to be
required for us to argue that we have detected something real
in the world.
I'm in a stop there and thank you