Guten Abend und meine Damen und Herren. Ich möchte gerne
das philosophische Seminar und speziell Martin Hoffmann tanken für die Einleitung,
die Einladung, hier zu sprechen heute Abend,
obwohl ich Deutsch lese und das auch ein bisschen sprechen,
kann ich es nie schreiben, leider.
Ich möchte dann die heutige Lingua Franka brauchen,
das ist das Englisch, so, entschuldigen Sie mich für das,
wie ich liebe die deutsche Sprache,
aber es ist zu schwierig,
die deutsche Sprache
This evening, I will discuss so smelonskis,
objection from moral shallowness, against competible
ism, in the debate on free will and moral responsibility.
Would makes this subjection important is that responding to it drives awatch,
between optimists and fatalists, would in your competibleists camp?
Now, underhandout, I have have given a kind of
outline of the basic positions.
And I will reharis it very quickly.
Introducinged some basic terminology will be helpful to low cated
to issue
If the termin is a miss true, then the facts
of the past together with the loss of nature,
and tail all facts of the present and the future.
In the terminism is the the nial of the trute of
the terminism. Campacibalism is the view that free will three
action and moral responsibility or campossible with the terminism.
In competibleism is the opposite few which you denice this competability.
Libertarians or in competible ists hoo believe that at
least someothers at times, performed free actions for which we
are morally responsible
They are as a result indisterminists. Hard determinists,
or incompetibleists, who denite that we have the sort
of free will required for murror resultability. Hard incompetibleists,
the nited same, it respective of accepting determinists and all not.
In edition, it will be useful to this thing wish
between a circult leaway and a source few on the control
requirement for murror responsibility. The rest availability of alternative possibilities
with regard to actions and decisions for which we are more
really responsible,
excentral to
the first few
The Agents is being the souls or origin of such actions
and decisions iscentral do the second. So to the souls
few. Now, against this backdrop. Smilanski,
that's in Israellian for lost for in the debate,
is a kind of heart source in competibleist.
Who credisizes source competibleism, for being moraly shallow. After formulating is objection,
I examine, john, Martin Fisherses,
optimistic competibleist response to it,
which is according to me left with considerable deficulties
To Escape from Bagging the Question, against the incompetibleist,
I subsequently invogue, pull russlerses, competibleist,
fatelist position, and developed further, to counter smelonskissus subjection.
Whithin this excended three work by appealing to what I cole,
the seriousness of human agency, and also the contengency of human agency,
I will try to disappate smelonskisclaim that competibleist accounts of ultimate origination
or moraly shallow
Let's first look at the objection of Smilonski.
They can see the handout and I will make use of
it to referred to quote and so on.
When now are at point see,
so let's first have a clear view of the objection.
Smilonski defense socceral surcults successor view to hard determinism.
Given the absons of libertarian free will is so cold fundamental
doalism combine stupositions.
Heart determinism and competibleism
Bootpositions are partially valued. According to Smelonski, campetibleism,
makes important distinctions. For example, between campelt and normal three actions.
These important distinctions are often on the face of it,
moraly significant, even in a deterministic world.
How ever? Also according to Smelonski,
if we like strong, libertarian, free will,
we must accept the insights of heart determinism.
Not with standing the in the ingenious and through for lessons
learned from competibleism
If there is no robust threedom in the universe. And eterminal is mist true,
then ultimately, no one has any control what surever,
and no one is ultimately morally responsible for anything.
Consequently, ignoring this basic heart the terministic insight
and different shating between people on the basis
of proximate control and distributing local moral responsibility,
in competible is terms is just on fair,
is just morally shallow
I mean can look now at the first quote, of Smelonski,
who explains diskind of charge, do words to competibleist. However,
sophisticated, the competibleist formulation of control in the broad sense,
and whether it focuses on character, reflection,
ability to follow reasons or anything else,
available at the competibleists level, Indiant,
no wong can have ultimate control over dead,
for a which one is being judged.
Oh, that takes place on the competibleists level,
it respective of the local distinctions in respect of control,
becomes on the ultimate level, What was marily there?
Ultimately the riving from courses, beyond the control of the podicipans.
People are not from the ultimate persperspective, responsible for their
choices innections. We cannot churk, the perspective from which
all that happens, is ultimately a matter of lock.
And hands, in one way, and hands,
in one way morily or bittery.
And on one fit basis for fair differentiation a mon people
. Competible ism is in itself morily shallow
Smelonskis is Objection from Morrow Sherlones, is a generic Objection, against competible
ism. It's applies to all forms of competibleist control,
to high rarcical control of harry frankfurt,
to reasons responsive control of Martin Fisher,
and to normative control of for example, susan wolve.
Old the day establish eaching its own way, is a
local distinction in respect of control on the competibleist level.
Whatever theoretical sophistication exercising, competible ist control,
ultimate leader rives from courses, beyond such control.
From the ultimate perspective, all competible ist control,
reduces, according to Smilanski, to proximate control,
which is an in addicult basis
for fair, moral, responsibility attributions. For example,
non-orbitary, blaming of people. In short,
Smilanski is reasoning, bulls it bulls down to the
lusely formulated more to stolens on your handout
First Premise fair attribution of moral responsibility, requires ultimate control.
So if one really whole someone moraly, responsible for an action,
danny has to have ultimate control, over that action.
Second premise, but competible ism lex a conception of
alultimate control, it only has forms of proximate control.
Geclusion, competible ism is unfair is moraly shallow and it's
distribution of more responsibility
Na, südably interpreted, smilanski is this first premise,
is on controversion. Because solce competibleists as well as source
in competibleists accept one or other version of this source
or origination requirement for more or responsibility. My main point is over,
that's melanski is a subjection, backs the question,
by is seeming that the second premise,
competibleism lex a conception of ultimate control.
So ehe backs the question according to me with regard to
two. This is a point are will eliberate very extensifly
And to do that, I first done to fisher.
Allo, a conception of ultimate control is usually associated with libertarianism.
All so competibleists, can develop on account of search control,
but this can partible with determinism.
Can sider the following proposal. If an agent has ultimate
control in performing and action, then he is the ultimate originator
or source office action. Now, according to is yaku,
Haji, tree conditions are source efficient for ultimate origination.
And that's your second quote on the hand up
So, this is just to conceptualize, what original,
sorry, what ultimate origination is. The course,
or adleast, a coursel and teasident of the free
action must be a component of the type of course,
that place as sailian drow in the production of action or free action.
The course, good not be something,
like the beating of an agencies hard.
Discourse or part of it must in some obvious sense
be internal do its agent
It is it cannot be the originator, of course, the agent.
The course, nost be at least partially conscitive of the
agent in a way in which in virtue of being so conscitive.
It would be correct to say that the action trually issues
from the agent. Or is the agents is own,
or is one over which the agent has control?
It is something like the tourd condition here that conceptions of
ultimate origination seek to capture.
This account of ultimate origination is can partible with the supposition
that any three action is the terministically coast
Libertarians. Denn just have to add, the food condition,
that the course in one to intry,
must be a non, the terministic course,
or must itself be norm the terministically coast,
if it coursely the terministic, if it courses,
the terministically the free action.
This extracondition, takes care of norm the terministic or probablistic coursation,
as well as on the termine, agent coursation.
Old those millansk is as objection, generally And generically challenges,
oh, competibleist positions. I focus for the purpose is
of this talk to night. On ficious is conception of
reasons, responsive control, as required for more responsibility.
A quick review of face position will be useful.
Key look at the second bage of your handout,
so at the other side, small summary of of ficious position.
Moral responsibility, he claims, demons only one way
guidance control
That can be examplified in the actual coso,
the Terministic sequence of events, culminating in behavior.
Actions, emissions and their consequences are on a power in
not requiring to way regulative control
or alternative possibilities for responsibility. Fishered proposes that guides control
has to components, nighter of which determinism treatens.
At the things is pre-supposed between the kind of mechanism
that actually gosely issues the ages as behavior
and other source of mechanism
The reasons, responsiveness component, the first component,
requires, that the mechanism that actually course of the action,
be appropriately sensitive to reasons.
And the ownership component, the second component, requires,
that the mechanism by that the mechanism,
be the ages is own.
Reefly put, and agent has guides control in performing an action,
if and only if,
the action is uses from is own reasons,
responsive mechanism
To deal with the facts problem of manipulation,
reasons responsiveness, requires supplementation with the mechanism ownership component,
to god against cosel springs of faction,
being aquired in a männer that's a virds morrow responsibility.
In fact, ficious ownership component, articulates his interpretation of
the source or origination requirement for morrow responsibility.
And it is in terms of mechanism ownership that deformal lates
a competableist account of ultimate origination or control
And agent has according to fisher, ultimate control,
over is behavior, in votue of taking control,
over the mechanisms that produce it.
And the takes this control by taking responsibility,
by which and agent makes a mechanism truly his ow.
I will, and swould a little bit samrise this theory,
by saying, look, fisher,
requires, guidance control or reasons,
responsive control
for more responsibility
Yet, in spide of ficious to theoretical sophistication,
according those melansky, this competibleist account,
in terms of reasons responsive news, and taking responsibility,
offers a shallower sword of meaning of ultimate control,
then required for the fair attribution of moral responsibility,
says the kind of control,
which is taken by taking responsibility,
still the rives from courses beyond the ageses control,
it cannot properly be cold
ultimate control
Guidance Control is not sufficient for the intended sense of
ultimate control. Given the teasers of the terminism,
the ways in which reasons responsive mechanisms and ownership processes,
operate or ultimately a matter of luck.
Ficious competibleist account of ultimate origination, requiring only guys
this control from morrow responsibility remains therefore as volterable to smilonski's
objection from morrow shaloness as any other competibleist account
Now, in his response toose melanskies objection.
Fisher makes to not worthy points in defense of competible ism.
He starts by remarking that all the origination, or source
requirements, for mother responsibility, or in general acceptable.
They should be interpreted in some suitable sense. That is to say,
moraly responsible agents must meet some appropriate conditions that capture the
intuitions of source hood.
Unders, the epsodes of allionation
Yet, according to fisher,
the incompetibleist interpretation of these conditions is much to demanding.
This they electrical country move basically and sists in laying bear,
the elalsary character of the inflated bicture of human agency and more resplansibility,
that source incompetibleists likes
melansky presuppose. First is first not voice here mark.
On this inflated bicture. The locus of control most be
entirely within the agent for him to be moraly responsibilit
Against this requirement of total control for mollow responsibility,
Fisher adduces that there always exist, hosely,
enabling or sustaining conditions in the background of our agency,
which are beyond our control.
He reminds us of entirely external factors,
search as my not being born with with a damage brain.
My perences, feeling and cloding me,
when I was young.
The sunses,
continuing to shine
And the earths is not being hit by a meti rid.
Right now. So there like an read and continue to read you.
These are conditions over which to agent has absolutely no control.
But there on the nably are cosel contributors to his psychological constitution,
agency and more responsibility. Hence,
the incompetibleists requirement of total control,
including control over these cosely contributing factors and I core fisher,
seems to be a kind of
metal physical
make a lomania
It is just a fantasy. And of quote. Since no one,
ever has control, over such external necessary conditions.
The requirement of total control for motor or responsibility,
seems to be luditic. In a moment, I will
separatly elect on a second point, made by fisher.
But list first reflect on this first point.
In the week of ficious refirst reply,
I as a fellow competible ist,
good but aside the request ofs melansky and other source in
competibleists for total control
I could say, the requirement for total control,
when you take that as your guine of Benchmark for ultimate control,
that search guined of conception,
is just the Pipe dream, is just the illusion.
Inview of the inappropriate, and undolly demanding in competible is picture,
it seems much more plosable,
and reasonable to accept a competible is account of ultimate origination.
This are the mount for absolute self-creation,
is a kind of matterphysical makeolomania, identurns out that competibleist control,
such such as reasons responsive control, is after row,
perfectly capable of making the moraly
non-shello distinction, within the actual corsely the terministic sequence
of events, within the mear unfolding of the given.
Between blame and prese worthy persons and those who are not.
I could leave it with Fisher at that.
However. Blade andly the nying,
the legitter macy of the request for something more than competibleist reasons
responsive or Another cherrist form of competibleist control,
seems to be on the virge of begging the question, against in competibleist.
Accepting source requirements for motor responsibility, as I do,
leaves I said mit a residie of in competibleist doubt.
So mean competibleists will retterly agree that to talk ontrol is of course,
not what is required for the fair attribution of moral responsibility.
Still, given, to necessary background coditions,
there has to be as efficient degree of relevant up
to meanes for moral fairness
And there does not seem to be as efficient
basis of control, required for a non-orbitary blaming.
As long as the proposed kind of control,
leaves to many relevant factors, beyond the agencies control.
Some competibleists will be tribbled by this incompetibleists doubt.
That they're proposed kind of control this not meet the minimal
requirements for being a type of freeleven control.
So that on this insufficient basis moral responsibility attributions become unfair
and shallow
For decensible competibleists, there remains does, what I cole a negging toth.
Not so easily discuted. Dealing with this drouble
some residue why a still at hereing to competible ism,
leads as we will see do an in-house split between competibleists.
But let me first return to ficiouses second point,
in this response do's melanski. In its interesting most recent
reaction to the moral or betraying is challenge of Smelanski.
He proups, Smelanski is crucial and this for on examined assumption.
The invocation of the ultimate level or perspective. So Smelanski,
in charging the competibleists, in vokes a preceposition,
and that is the preceposition of the ultimate level or
ultimate perspective
Even in the light of ficious competible is destinction,
between regulative and guidances control, smelonski holes,
as we've seen, that for example, punishing areasons,
responsive criminal, who also takes responsibility,
who was actions this this
no disablite exhibit guidances control, is from the mentally unfair.
Or morally shallow and the adds from the ultimate perspective.
It you'd explicitly be made clear,
that's melonski suss challenge ineferriably involkes at ultimate perspective
Fisher Introducers, the photographic metterfore of zooming out and zooming
in to capture this assumption of melancek is this subjection.
Taking the ultimate perspective is then a metter of zooming out for the purpose of seeing,
how what you are focus, sorry,
is then a metter of zooming out for the purpose of seeing,
how what you are focusing on fits in the world as a whole.
So taking this perspective is taking a more detached,
objective you
Das Milonski ist das argument from moral shaloness against competible ism,
as it invogues the ultimate perspective, is clearly a zooming out argument.
Old our fisher, does not the smith,
all zooming out arguments, he reases some critical questions
about the application of this strategy. You can see this
questions on the tourt quote. In general,
I believe that we should ask it veries questions,
when we are invited,
to take up a perspective from addistance for the purposes of
evaluaration of something
Example, the meaning of life, the nature of more
responsibility and so forth. The first question is about what
can infact be seen from the commanded perspective.
The second question is why this perspective should be taken at all.
And the toast question, the tod question is,
why it should be deemed high jimonic.
If indeed, it is put it tivally so.
And a school. After pressing these critical questions
and at mitting his lack of a knockdown argument,
against milanskis
is contention
That seeing ourselves from the zoomt outperspective as ambedded in a
cosely the terministic world, or bliterates our more responsibility,
fisher in conclusion, the nice the following,
you can find is conclusion also on your hand out.
I didn't know that zooming out and every handing that cosel the terminism is it true,
we lead us to believe that we our relevantly similar to robots or marianets.
It will only do so, if it a view from our far,
obscures, the features of certain cosely the terministic secreses,
that ground morrow responsibility, Meganism Ownership and reasons responsiveness.
These features can be present inecursely the terministic sequence.
And they are in know way videyated or eateulated,
when one season as embedded in a larger context.
And of code. Do my mind, they remain however
a lot of dribble some lose ends in ficiouses examination
ofs melonskieses, zooming out argument. I briefly assess,
ficiouses reply by going true history critical questions about the invitation
to take the ultimate perspective on the nature of morrow responsibility
First. As to the what can be seen, question.
Fisher agreeze that adopting as soufficiently distant perspective or bliterates
or relevant distinctions. But that's simply and uninterestingly shows that if
the distance becomes to great, then the differences which are still there, become invisible.
From some distance, far outside, not only the difference
between resibles, from responsive persons and robots or marionets.
But also that between real and fake
diamonds become invisible
Henns, we should better not take a perspective that randers
invisible the real characteristics, that can on the right,
more respectability, recent responsiveness and mechanism ownership.
Not from some distance far asside, outside,
but from a sudably, did tech to perspective, official claims,
one can see that individuals some times exhibite guidance control.
Now all talk about about perspectivism is tricky.
And of course, reminiscent of Thomas Neigelses internal and external
stand points
And bietest drosses reactive and objective attitudes. So what exactly want good reasonably ask,
does fisher mean here by a südably did touched perspective.
Suppositly it means something detouched from the really subjective perspective of an agent,
but not too much and suddenly not so much as to
shade into the fully detouched, objective perspective.
But wipe recycly, want good further ask,
is it's midway perspective, it pistime logically and or ontologically
privileged in camparison with both the really subjective,
and the objective for the detect perspective.
According to fisher, what can be seen from the studio that text perspective,
can not be seen anymore from the fully did tätched perspective.
More specifically, the property of exhibiting guidest control is visible,
and there from the first perspective,
while it is not visible anymore,
but according to fisure still there from the letter fully
did didged perspective
Matt What? On could still further us is fishers us evidence
for the claim that he's favorite responsibility grounding property is still there if
it is not visible anymore from the perspective from a far.
How does you know that is a real objective property and
not a projecteds one from a perspective suitably detaged from the subjective perspective?
Fisher needs shots positive evidence and knowledge because smilonskiss is zooming
out argument precise league encludes that the property of excibiting guided
this control is night or visible nore there anymore from the
ultimate perspective
Second. As to ficious us why at all question.
I would assist that the ultimate perspective is always there as
a possibility. If only temporarily. And once having occupite
this object defented point, we can no longer ignorit.
So given that. And I could thomas nago.
Given that the push to objectivity is after all a part
of the framework of human life. I think,
in the line of nago and Smilanski,
that we cannot avoid occupieing the external stand point anymore
More over as thomas nago Remarks, it is only when we cognitively occupie. Sorry,
it is only when we cognitively take the oltimate perspective,
and see ourselves, subspeak you, determinatis,
as the unfolding of the distant past and lose of nature,
that the philosophical problem of free will,
them oral responsibility as generated.
And once one seas individuals who oldn't narrally exhibit guidance control
from this ten point. There reasons responsive mechanisms are company
by their ownership of these mechanisms seem to be preamted,
by the distant past and lose of nature,
as milanski,
a mong other source in competibleists claim
Turt, as to the Germanic Question. One good,
a very welcome seed that the fully detaged objective perspective is not hey Germanic.
We doubt there by emplying that the suitably did ted it perspective
has then, hey Germany, he Germany, instead.
Highemonie in the place of the first word.
I would more culturesly say that nighter the ultimate,
nore the half-way perspective is previleged
As be to strolshen in a similar context of serves and I coating,
we lack reason for saying,
Ider that the scientific objective standpoint or that the human the
ceptual and morrow standpoint gives us the exclusively correct type of
conception of the real nature of things and of cood.
To rationally settle, the hey Germanic question,
we would need a persperctive, which was supperiod to either.
But there is know search absolut perspective.
So according to this line of thought,
what can be seen from ider perspective is equally real
Reases responsiveness, plus taking responsibility,
as well as the mear and folding of the given.
And it is the tension between these to real effects,
which producers in some competible ists, the negging told identified early rum.
Now, fisher's susply for limiting ourselves to assuitably detect perspective,
whatever that exactly means, looks again,
like an invitation to begging the question,
against in competible ist.
Accepting perspectivism
Wild a voiding campetible is dogmatism as I do. Goods how
ever pressure on the matter physical relevance of competible is distinctions.
Over from the suitably detects perspective. Individuals,
exhibiting guidoes control or another form of competible ists control,
come clearly into focus from the fully detect,
objective perspective, the negging poet, creeps up that,
they as the outcome of the distant past and lose of nature,
lack all moral responsibility
Normalerweise justian to do with this incompetibleist residue as a competibleist,
is to opt for the position of what pool
Russell, course, competibleist fatalism. Which respect to the
issues of the terminism and origination, Russell devides,
the competibleist camp into optimistic optimistic optimistic orthodox competibleists and pessimistic competibleists fatalists.
I have given these do destinctions on your handout.
So we didn't the camp, sorry
Of the competibleists, he contrasts optimists and pessimists.
Goat groups, accept the competibility of moral responsibility with the terminism.
But the letter also econologies that the terminism employs a specific
kind of fatalism. To for stall objections, russell,
emidedly disting visuals further between contributory, fatalism, and origination faitalism.
The classical competibleist retoured, that the terminism should not
be you fused with fatalism, allly pertains to deformer type
of fatalism
Indeed. The Terminism does not emply that agencies practical reason
does not contributed to decoursal secrets of events.
But contriputory faitalism, should not be mixed up with origination faitalism.
Origination faitalism wholes that are person is subject to fate.
Not because of the fact, that his reasons responsive deliberations
and ecisions do not contributed to the coursal coursals of event.
But because of the fact, that his character and conduct
have origins that ultimately extent beyond his control
Oldo, Reasons, responsive mechanisms, or culsely effective in action,
they have there ultimate origin in mechanisms beyond,
the individuals is control.
Now, according to competible ist fate lists,
the Terminism does not emply contributory fatealism, but only origination fatealism.
Competible is fatealism, wholes that determinism emplies conditions of universal origination fatealism.
Such just lock and in evidentability. We doubt there
by excluding that dececonditions are or at least good be competible
with moral responsibility
Against the backdrop of this sterbonology, fisher classifies,
I which it just as a cheerful.
Orthodox competibleist. And it's responsed to Melonski,
he eventually words of all what Russell calls,
problems of old the massy at the Horizon.
He blinds himself for the impact of origination fatalism,
and optimistically a firms the moral non-shaloners of potonent competibleists distinctions.
Considered a following typical passage and that's quote 4
or your handout
All we live out the complexity about semi competible is a
managers use it as a form of competible ism.
Campetible ism always as a capitatible ism alows,
as to track common sense. In making distinctions,
between those factors, that operate in such away,
as to undermine responsibility, and those that do not.
And the competible is need not give up the idea,
that's some times individuals, row bustly,
this of punishment for their behavior.
Where rest on other rocations,
they row bustly
Moral commandation and reward. That is a competibleist need not eatulate or reaconfigure,
the white spread and natural idea that individuals morally deserve to
be treated hursely in certain circumstances and kindly anothers.
We need not in any way them down
or revolution at henious deeds or our admiration for human goodness
and even here rism and of cood.
Now in the absence of libertarian free will
robust three will
I think, that's search ofverly robust and result loote
apprecials and verdicts are much to optimistic. As I've are
a good, such competibleist optimism is not warnted.
As it is question beggingly based upon a myopic few of the issues.
In contrast, the competibleist fatelist,
takes the ultimate see waries of in competible ism that seriously.
As pecially would regard to oltimate origination,
in competibleists find the implications of the terminism droppling
or dissturbing
To repeat, if the terminism is true,
then no one is the ultimate orrigination,
the ultimate orriginator office decisions, and inview of purton and source requirements,
no one ever is ultimately morally responsible for his actions.
Now, it is by recicnizing,
the role of fate and look in the ultimate origination of moral responsibility,
that the competibleist fate list tries to incorporate search pessimistic in competibleist
tools about implications of the terminism
The competible is faterlist in Harrids from this incompetible is pessimism has a result,
the negging thought, that there is something lastingly worrying about origination
faterlism as a regards the fair attribution of moral responsibility.
Now within the can finds of this talk to night.
I can evaluate nighter the cassistancy,
nore the theoretical advantage of competibleist faterlism in detail
A summing the general people ability of this position,
I only Adam Braid, why a competibleist account of ultimate origination,
suitably fotofied with the oxily rehop,
high potterses of competibleists faitelism, is not moraly shallow.
For the purpose is of this talk, I again,
focus on ficious this sky this control,
but my line of tools can easily be generalized and applied
to other forms of competibleists control.
To be sure, this is not establish and not down
argument,
against belonski
sus objection
But it that least offers and alternative competible is picture.
Yet, what is more sees of this picture is also
can genial to Spilonskis is half harted competible
ism? It's contemplation serves as an invitation for Spilonski to
drop the hard deterministic part of his fundamental do alism.
According to Russell. The competible is faitalist is committed to
a certain picture of human beings,
which has a direct impact on his conception of human agency
This bicture contrasts with a picture of having total control of the incompetibleist.
It is the quote number 5 on your handucked.
However in go herean and unattractive, the ideal of pure
on conditioned agency maybe, what is strobbling about origination fatalism,
is that it can fronts us with the limits of human agency.
The inescapable fact that the ultimate source of our
character and conduct lies beyond us
Or finitude and place in the order of nature,
has implications for our conception of ourselves as genuine agents.
To insist on easy optimism in face of such tools about
the human condition, is a form of superficiality,
to which orthodox competibleists are much to pro and of good.
No, my response to melonsk is this objection,
as well as fishers as superficiality,
as it is based on,
the seriousness of contingency is
and alaboration of disgitution
Origination Fate is a blued fact of human existence.
We are not over own making. Reflection on this fact,
refuels the innovitable can dingency of the constitution of our character
and our capacity for practical reasoning.
Reasons responsive mechanisms whether there are well functioning or mel functioning,
our required within the inescapable limits of human agency set by
nature and nature
Search mechanisms are ulultimately constituted, at least partly,
by condingencies, over which the agent has absolutely no control.
The condingent effects of jeans and memes on them,
are ineloctably beyond, the agents has control.
Now gooth, orthodox campetablists. And in competablists,
seem to ignor, or not to fully echnology
this basic fact of the human condition.
Sheerful campetablists, proceed as if origination feed does not matter
Wild in competibleists lamond as if it makes oh, responsible agency impossible,
or alternatively, they substituted with the mith of self-creation.
The blue fact of origination fate sets for humans,
the limits for free will and more alresponsibility.
In the view of the fact,
that we our finight human beings and not infinight self-creators.
The competibleist faterlist beliefs,
then that competibleist distinctions are the best and only ones,
we can get
in this the deterministic world
Yet, die Förderinsists that all though, we must relions,
that's a distinctions for our attributions of moral responsibility.
We should not lose the precarious basis of this distinctions out
of side. Here reminders and especially is orthodox fellow competibleists
of our continent place in the order of nature.
He focuses attention on the contengency of our origin as agents
and the fact that our agents our pre-performed in the light
of the post and lose of nature
Bei das Eliciting and awareness of contentiency,
he provokes disconcerting feelings, which in that turn,
engender essence of seriousness,
camparities frame of mind with the sudden realization,
that this is you that this is your one and only life.
And house such and absetting mental state imbused the things you
see and do with gravity.
Precisely, because your life is fine night and can tingent
in this series business
The choices you make, and the things you do are
not indifferent or friverness. What you know do,
get never we made and done any more?
The campetible is faitor list, urgus ponners,
the need for taking seriously, are contentiency. Now,
part of what it means to take are contentiency as human agence seriously,
should find expression in taking or competible is distinctions seriously.
Making search distinctions is not a tool a light hard
at metter
Competible listens, should droe, these distinctions, the only once,
we have being fully aware of the series negging thought,
that they have their freddied basis in the condition capacities for human agency.
It is exactly, this serious existential background,
against which competible is distinctions are drome,
that makes them withy and performed.
Recizely, because such destinctions are deep seated in human can
dingensy, they are not moraly shallow
The distinction between mechanisms that are reasons responsive and those that are not,
asrouted in the seriousness of can dingensy, is therefore moraly non-shellow.
Taking seriously competably distinctions as grounds for attributing moral responsibility,
is in other words, don't non-orrbitary procedure,
for can dingen beings like us,
to judge cases of the third and punishment.
Different shating blame and prese werty persons from those,
we're not on competible is principles, is
not don't superficially. But on the country, seriously,
with a negging tourt about human can dingens seat
the back of once head
In Edition such competible is fately seriousness, can be on the one hand,
can be an enti dode for the complacency of orthodox competible is.
The often misplaced campetible is optimism should be temperate by
bringing to mind to trouble some in competible is tresidue.
On the other hand, the competible is fatelyst,
orgsilliary high pottercies can be an ententi dode for the dispare of incompetible
ism. The often misplaced incompetible is pessimism,
should be eliviated by aquising in the avoidable finited,
can tingensy and fragility of human existence.
So, accuding to the competibleist fatalist,
the only things we really have are the serious moraly,
non-show low competibleists distinctions, together,
with the equaly serious fatalistic negging thought in the background.
Which respect to issues of this ird and ponnishment,
this predicument, should make our apresels and verdicts more
clement or as a minimum less self-righters.
That make a clude
What has been a complished by shifting from the orthodox campetible
ist picture to the competible ist fater list one?
What in the extended competible ist fater list framework, smilonskiss is
objection from moral shalonus, as losely for formalized in the modestorms formed on your handout
on the first speech, can be counter it,
because it second premise turns out to be folds.
When supplemented with the oxilary high particies, of competible
ist fater listen, campetible ism Hass actually at its disposal
several morally non-shallow conceptions of ultimate control.
I'm mong which fictions as guy this control.
So the second premise is fulls. And so all do
the argument because it's a more this dolence is affiliate.
It is not sound. This this high pottercise,
so the oxilary high pottercise of competible is fatilism,
in corporates to in competibleist worries about ultimate origination in the terministic world,
such accounter move,
does not seem to back the question against source in competibleism
How severe, is the inhouse split between competibleists?
For boats in the orthodox competibleists and the competibleist faitleists,
the facts of the deterministic world or the same.
But when the faitleist,
takes the ultimate perspective and seas the world,
subspeak you determinatis, the negging tods about ultimate origination creeps up.
Impressed by origination fatelism and the serious in the soft
continentiency He Darapon in vides, his orthodox followmate,
to supplement competibleism with a perfound existential attitude.
The teatings is necessary for the fair attribution of moral responsibility.
Being sensible competibleists is also a matter of having to appropriate
attitude dowards to human condition.
At mittedly, competibleist faitalism, stands in need of further eleboration.
Especially as to the problems of moral lock and human tradidity
. But it's main virtue is that it keeps open the
mystery of freeble.
Thank you for your otention