Thank you. Thank you very much Professor Iger for inviting me and good evening to all of you.
Yes, the
Collaborative Research Center, Sonderforschungspreich 597 at the University of Bremen is on
transformations of state and
that is a joint effort of political science, economics and law and
research is the transformations of statehood within the last 30 or 40 years and one
big trend which triggers
transformations of the state is globalization and I'm in the in the law area of this
project and the project A4 is
today called the Constitution of Global Commerce because now we are in phase three of the project already so but the first
phase was on legal certainty in global exchange processes, which is basically commercial law from a legal standpoint
in a global context, but it is a
interdisciplinary project which is
co-headed by Joerg Freiling which is a business
professor in Bremen and we have as well
economists working in there and
political scientists, which is here. Where is he? I can't see him now.
He was here and I can't see him now, but he is my assistant and so
Okay, that's okay. So today I want to tell you something about this general research project
but within the context of a certain discussion as Professor Iger already indicated. It's a discussion on
the law market or the competition of jurisdictions, which is quite familiar
I think to you already and Professor Iger told me that you had already a presentation of Professor Eidenmüller here who published in
2009 a journal article called Recht, its product, law as a product and
we have a very
another book, a very important book, which was published in February 2009 by O'Hara and Ribstein,
which is called The Law Market and
basically what they say is they bring together all these ideas on the competition of
jurisdictions or regulatory competition, which started off in the United States with this
competition of company laws and the so-called Delaware Effect, which is very familiar to you, I guess and
which was transferred then to the European Union by
by jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, the Centros and so on things
so we have a and now it's all over the place and
not only in company law, but in all other, there he is
company law,
the insolvency laws and so on, so basically what O'Hara and Ribstein say is people shop for the most efficient
substantive law where freedom of choice exists at all and
they have one chapter only which is not on substantive law, that's on arbitration
but basically what they say is people use arbitration as a means to shop around
inefficient mandatory law which prohibits
choice of law. So and then Eiden Muller in his article,
Recht als product says, well most examples, he brings together a lot of examples where there is a competition
of law or institutions and
there's only little in there on
not on substantive law, but on procedural arrangements for the enforcement of law or dispute resolution
but there is some the first point is that in the discussion on the Delaware effect
many people have said okay, it's not only the company law, but it's also the the courts which are very specialized
and the administration and the lawyers the solicitors and barristers or whatever the lawyers which are very specialized in
company law and that all this
institutional arrangement together makes makes this Delaware effect
there is another
publication which I want to
highlight here, which is from Stefan Fucht he published on
our international merchants stupid which is on SSN since
2007 and I think it's published now 2008 or something. I don't know where exactly. I guess you know that as well
he was
working on the hypercesis of many common law lawyers which said okay, common law is more efficient somehow
and then he said well, let's look what in international commercial
contracts the merchants have the freedom of choice to choose their law and let's have a look on what their choice is actually he received
some data from the International Commercial Court of
Court of International Commercial
arbitration of the ICC the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris and
it came out that English law was
selected around
24% but then the supposedly inefficient laws of Switzerland
France and even German law were selected as well
and he said that evidence shed some doubt on the superior
superiority of the common law view all this is arranged around the idea that norms should be efficient and
My basic point of view is or my thesis is that this is the wrong way to to look at the issue
Or not. It's not wrong, but it's not complete and it's a failure of lawyers
especially lawyers working at the university which are not practicing law that they always think well
It's important the content of norms is important. In fact, my thesis is the contents of norms is not
very important
Especially not when you talk about cross-border
Phenomenums the communication transactions and so on
But what is much more important is the general institutional framework?
Like it is understood by institutional economists
Like Douglas North or Oliver Williamson and so on
Which ask from a different perspective and that's
Here a different focus of the A4 project. That's our research project and Bremen
We don't
Elaborate on the need for efficient norms, but on the need for efficient
Institutions for contract enforcement and I have just two quotes here Adam Smith
1776
commerce and manufacturers can sell them flourish long in any state in which the face of contracts is not supported by law and
in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed and enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are
able to pay and
revived now by Douglas C. Norris
the noble laureate in 1994
I think the inability of societies to develop effective low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both
historical stagnation and
contemporary under development in the third world
Thereby highlighting the importance of effective contract enforcement
institutions the problem again
with lawyers and with economists is
that they take most of them are
Situated and working in OECD countries and they take an effective
state provided system for contract enforcement for granted
once you
Go beyond the nation state and especially beyond the OECD states countries
It's not at all granted that there are
public
institutions in place which which create an
arrangement for the effective enforcement of contracts
First of all, that's not the case in transformation states and developing countries and there's a very important book by Dixit
From 2004 which is called lawlessness and economics thereby implying that if law
Understood as state created law is absent weak corrupt or simply inefficient
then other
Pride mainly private governance mechanisms
Step in the place of this and and become much more important
so but that's basically this book of Dixit is basically again on not not on international commerce, but on
Institutions in these developing countries more or less our question in our
research project then is
the leading question how is cross-border commerce institutionally organized and we began by making up a
kind of
Toolbox of governance mechanisms, which may be employed by commerce not only international commerce, but as well commerce in general
and
we we split that up by the
legislation adjudication enforcement, that's the
Separation of powers thing which is should be familiar to you and then we split it up public and private
But within the private sphere as a regulator
sphere dimension of this
toolbox
We have three different types and trilateral bilateral or unified governance mechanisms
and that's basically we take that from Oliver Williams and economics of governance and
and
When you combine that then you get this neat toolbox of 12 different governance mechanisms and our thesis then is
First of well, no, let me start with our observations
But I'll play explain that public governance mechanisms for the enforcement of contracts. It's very clear. It's it's
legislation state courts and legal legal sanctions, which is basically
legal enforcement mechanisms then private trilateral trilateral
Means that the governance mechanism is not from the two parties of a transactions
But a third party is involved, which is a private party not a state party then you have all kinds of social norms
private codifications a big issue in
Transnational law like the uni draw principles of international commercial contracts or the draft common frame of
reference in European law which are made either by academics or by
International public institutions like uni draw but without a mandate of the member states
They just do it did it on their own and they promote it as as something which
Is called very often a norm entrepreneurs or something. They suggest these norms for international commerce to be used
As well very important among this topic of social norms is our
Is customary law in in commerce hundreds brochure I don't know the correct word I think it's customs and
Then very important of course private courts arbitration
And especially that's important in in national commerce as well arbitration as possible
As well in a completely domestic case, but it's more important in international cases and
then
social sanctions which are basically the exclusion from a group or an
essential facility for instance very often trade is
organized in trade clubs or there is an exchange for instance and
for a certain branch
trading
Trading cotton or trading diamonds for instance. There are very famous works from Lisa Bernstein on these two examples and
If you want to be in this
Branch in this industry, then you have to have access to this exchange for instance
So if they exclude you because for instance you didn't
Follow an arbitral award of their specialized arbitral courts
then you can't trade in this industry anymore worldwide more or less they have blacklists reputation and
even this exclusion
Mechanism basically these are then there's an interesting thing called private bilateral. That's the
the relation between the transactions partners is basically stabilized without
Involving a third party just by themselves and there are different explanations for this that's one more
Sociological legal sociological which is called
relational contracting by
MacNeil and Macaulay, but today it's reinterpreted by economists in a game theoretic way
They have these game series of repeated games and basically the upshot is you don't you live up to your contractual
obligations because
the
the win you can have or the positive the gain you can have from from
defeating an obligation is
Smaller than the potential when you have if the relationship is continued in the future
So that's basically this tit for tat theory, which was in Germany
worked out by Schmitt trends the head of the chamber of commerce now and he was a
In Hamburg and he was a scholar of Schmittian in the Britain
But it's as well now all over the place with Dixit and Eric Posner wrote his book on social norms
especially on these repeated games theory and
lastly, which is quite important is and very often as well because when we think about these things as lawyers we we
think about contracting then we don't think about the firm but the
Advantage of reading Williamson is that you should think about the firm the way of organizing transactions
That's basically the upshot of transaction
Theory
transaction cost theory that it's all that the firm and the market are alternative ways of organizing exchange, so
And then you have of course corporate norms corporate codes and so on you have dispute resolution
Within the firm by board decision and implementation by hierarchy simply by basically property rights
so
If you look now on all these mechanisms, I employed as well in domestic
Commerce and if you look to history there are important studies for instance by
Even a grave who will publish his book on institutions in the past to the modern economy in 2006
I think but there are a lot of studies
Grieff Milgram and
Barry wineghast as well who published on the ancient Lex mechatoria, which is basically the question when when in medieval Europe the trade
Came up how this was institutional organized and they said there was no European white law
There were no reliable public institutions to enforce contracts. And so they basically built up their own
institutions private institutions and
That was called the old or ancient Lex mechatoria, which is on this private trilateral basis
basically, and they have a lot of
Empirical evidence on that how that was organized and as well game theoretical explanations to that and
Then we have a lot of empirical research as I already said, for instance by Lisa Bernstein on
modern
kinds of private regulation there
But that's basically in very traditional
branches like the diamond trade which was them and dominated by Jews or
the
Cotton trade which was very local somehow organized in Florida
So we have another example in Bremen the cotton exchange in Bremen
Bremen bomb boy brother is basically organized in the same way as a Florida cotton
Exchange which was described by these a Bernstein
so if you know if you now look at what happened in 19th century, oh
The economy was organized basically privately
Basically by guilds merchant guilds and so on
But then the nation-state came and said I will nationalize commercial law by
Modernizing the institutions the court system and in the end of the day they started with modernizing the the court system and only
After that they started modernizing
As a substantive law in Germany, that's very obvious. We had the
Girichts for fast songs because that's the law on the organization organization of courts in it's from
1871 and the substantive law biggie be and Hage be then from 1900 so that
Makes clear my emphasis on education and enforcement from this institutional economic standpoint
Which which is much more important than the norms in themselves in this situation
so if you now make a step to
The organization the institutional organization of global commerce what we observed and we conducted several empirical studies
and
The first thing which is quite obvious for everybody who studied private international law
is that public contract enforcement institutions in a cross-border situation are
Relatively weak when compared to their functioning in the domestic realm
We you have these classical questions which cause decides jurisdiction which law applies
Conflict of laws and then the question if a judgment you
Get from state court could be enforced as well in another country and all that is not regulated on the international
Plane, but it's domestically regulated except for Europe, which is a special case
It's a mixture between the state and or a federal state and an international organization, but beyond that
The trade between the United States even between OECD countries. I'm not talking about trade with
Transformation states I'm talking about the trade
Within the OECD is organized with very very weak public institutions
It's not really working out there because all this is not regulated then especially the enforcement of
Judgments is not regulated on the in a binding way
So our observation then was that private governance the advantage of private governance mechanisms is that they are not?
territorially limited
So there's a trend towards privatization and de-formalization of the institutional organization of commerce
observed in our empirical studies
Just to give you some points private uniform governance. This is
Transactions organized within the firm is very important in international commerce
intra-firm trade, it's called accounts at least for one third of world exports and
There are there's no reliable data, but everything we can get from that us is that
they say
other other
Say it's 50 or even more percent of world exports is organized as intra-firm trade, but it was in multinational enterprises
especially if you account as well for
subcontractors and licensees which are formally independent, but
in fact in the global production and distribution chain, they're more or less economically dependent entities
then a lot of
World commerce is not organized on markets
But within firms and in the next four years we intend to research this issue much more in Bremen
Let me come to the private bilateral and informal trilateral which is not organized reputation systems
That's very important very important governance mechanism in international commerce to must eat who is present
conducted together with an economist's study in the software industry and
Their result was that that is completely outsourcing
German
firms
Buying software products from India or Romania or Bulgaria. It's completely operating outside the legal system
and
well
Finally the private formal trilateral governance that's formal is always which is organized and arbitration of course is highly organized
System of private governance and that's is the generally accepted dispute resolution
mechanism or form in international commerce. That's basically what is said in the literature and
Was a result as well from empirical studies we conducted. So if you now go back here the general trend
in international commerce is public
institutions become less important and that you have this trend of privatization and
informal is a or de-formal ization of governance
Very informal as a governance of transactions within a firm because it's not legal you can't for instance go to a court if just
Two two places of business of one firm have an transaction. They they can't go to the court because they are not
They have no standing
Private bilateral is very informal as well because nobody really controls
If a norm is broken, it's just one partner who says well you broke a norm. So I will exit or
and
Reputation systems which are not organized highly very informal as well, but all of this is more private and
Arbitration is very important one one of the most important
mechanisms in
commerce on in market exchange on the international plane and
Well, there's this big discussion on is there a new Lex Mercatoria
On this issue so lawyers especially then have big fights theoretical fights about the question
Is there a new Lex Mercatoria?
And then the question is always because lawyers always think of law as norms then they say well they but arbitration
arbitral tribunals
apply state law as but
If you look at this whole thing what happens in arbitration is basically they apply
maybe German or French private law, but
First of all, they do not apply it because the state
Regulated that this are the norms which would regulate commerce
but just by virtue of choice of law and but of the parties of the transactions, so it's a complete transformation of the idea of
regulatory monopoly of the state in this
Situation the second thing is that if when an arbitral tribunal applies for instance German private law
There are no stages of appeal
So you can't really be sure that they apply the same law which would be applied in a state court
Where you have the stages of appeal until the Federal Court of Justice in Karlsruhe
As well legal sanctions play an important role in arbitration
But as well social sanctions like reputation play an equally strong role
so it's basically what our idea is when you look at the institutional organization of international commerce that
there is a kind of
Pragmatic way in which lawyers international law firms use all these this toolbox and they just pick out what they like
and then they mix new governance cocktails and
there's a
Kind of mutation hybridization of these governance mechanisms there and really not public anymore, but there are some mixture of that
now let me come to the topic of
Of this lecture which is on
judicial services for global commerce
the question you can ask is
If you look from this perspective contract enforcement
One very important thing is dispute resolution and then enforcement
It's not so important what the norms are basically if it's a private norms or public norms
it's important that there is dispute resolution services which have the advantage of being enforceable somehow and
if you look now on this market you have providers and the providers are national courts as well as arbitration courts and
the consumers are merchants and firms involved in cross-border commerce who have a
Need for effective contract enforcement institutions from this perspective
so the different the different thing from this perspective is it's not basically in a competition of
effective norms like common laws more effective than continental law or something it's a
it's a competition between
Providers of governance mechanisms and basically important is dispute resolution and the question then
Is decisive in this if if they are results the judgments of the average well awards are enforceable in fact
Okay
I'm sure computer now you may have heard already from
You may have heard already from
Professor Eidenmuller who talked about that as well that
Within the last year in 2009 there certainly came up or the last two three years. They came up a kind of
competition
Of
state legal systems they
suddenly the state suddenly realized that they have to compete with each other on this market and
That they somehow compete as well with arbitration institutions. So it's a there's a players on the on the
Side of offer are not only
States
the players are as well private players like arbitration tribunals and
It's it's completely new that the state conceives of itself as being part of these
of this
competition first of all there was published this
and you can see what is what is typically for a competition is that you publish is that you advertise and
Here and you have these advertising brochures one was produced by the English law society
with a forward of the
Minister of justice or a secretary of justice. I think is the name correct name in England dispute resolution England and Wales the
jurisdiction of choice and they said well common law is the best law the English courts are the best ones and of course if
You want to go to arbitration English arbitrary arbitrary courts are the best ones as well and the idea of them was
to to bring
the business of dispute resolution
From from this global market to England not only disputes where an English firm is involved, but as well disputes
Between firms from countries where there is a state of lawlessness transformation states itself from the commonwealth
Come here to England and we make the business we have the lawyers and we have the courts
It's one year later or something in 2008
it began in Germany's discussion that we should do something for the German law and
But that was not so focused on our issue now on on courts
It was more focused on the on on different things on the quality of the German legal system
not in the competition for commercial disputes, but
As a
standard factor, I don't know the competition of
for investments if you come to Germany for instance
We have a good pool and it's all very secure. So if you buy a real property here, it's all we have notaries
It's all working out very well, but that's a completely different market. That's not the market for the competition
for for disputes and as well there was a
very big
Very important issue in there was this legal advice given legal advice to transformation states, which is a
Different thing as well. It's different from that what I'm talking about, but still
It was called law made in Germany, which is very funny because this law made in or made in Germany was this
from
1874 or something this British act for buying British and then ten years later. There was a big
Quora about that and the German Parliament and they say wow the English do this and and five years later already
The German merchants said oh, well, it's a quality sign now
And so this is the right answer law made in Germany and it was made in English which was
until then
unthinkable
Among German lawyers if you visit the German Ministry of Justice, there's no one able to talk English not the minister
We had with a German law journal
Which some of you may know we had a conference there on the 10th anniversary of the German law journal and the Ministry of Justice
And there were some all these old
public
Servants were from the ministry were and they all came and had all these little things to translated
Because no one none of them they live really in a very German world
so
Now the question is if we talk about competition for these disputes to bring them for instance to German courts because German courts work
very well, that's the underlying of
these
prospectuses for German law
Then we should have a look on how how good are German courts in the area of
commercial disputes and then we could say well, there is a special branch of German courts, which was introduced in 1874 as well
as a kind of reminder to the old law merchants these merchant courts we had we
institutionalized the chambers for commerce and they have just one one lawyer as a
professional judge and then there are two merchants in this chambers and
they are called command for hundreds often and
We just have here the caseloads the development of the caseloads between 1992 and 2008 and you can see from
62,000 cases per year it went down to
44,000 while you may know that in the same time the economy was growing quite strongly
And at the same time the internationalization of
The economy especially the German economy was growing as well very quickly
Just to give you an impression for instance
There is no reliable data on how many of this caseload is international cases
Which is an international case is always when at least one of the parties is not living in Germany
But we had some
We collected data from Bremen and from other
And in Bremen for instance, it's 13 percent of the cases in the Chamber of Commerce are 13 percent
Are international cases and you could compare that with the share of exports in the German gross national product
To order domestic product here GDP and that's 46 percent. So there's a lack
Then have a look on other charts now compared with the caseload of
Renowned international commercial courts, which is
The same time period 1994 to 2008 the German
arbitration association this torture institution for sheets correct work out is going up very high I think to
275 percent which
Which
Okay, the caseload is very low in absolute numbers because they started late in this business
But it is going up
Much and much older and much more renowned
Arbitration association is
International the court of international arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris
which exists I think like 19 since 1930 or something and
If you see their caseload is rising
About 75 percent in that period while the German cases and the state courts go down at 25 percent
There is no better daughter. It's not really comparable because it's German cases together with international cases and then
At the ICC you mainly have only these big international disputes
But still it's just to give you an impression. The problem is that international cases are not accounted for in the statistics
Now
If you see that the German courts, but as well we have data for the English courts, which are so nice as well, but they're
Caseload is going down as well. So there's a general trend as I said before
towards arbitration in international commerce
And now the question is if we have a competition with private and public actors all the national courts and then the arbitral courts
Of course, you think as a lawyer of competition law and you need a level playing field
for this competition and there is no level playing field because
for arbitral awards there in 1958 there was
made a
International convention the New York convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
Which had very little members only European countries and then later on the United States as well
but in the 80s and
Early 90s all the transformation states entered this convention and now today we have
144 state states which are a member of this convention. So even in China
It's no problem for instance or in other countries. It's no problem to enforce an arbitral award which comes from Paris
for instance or from Germany, so that's a very big advantage in this competition for
Arbitration and as I said before for state courts
There's no comparable instrument except for within the European Union
We have the Brussels convention or Brussels regulation since 2001 and before that we had a convention from 1968
So within Europe there may be this
Competition because
If you make a choice of court agreement for the courts of Hamburg you can
Execute or enforce this judgment all over Europe, but not in the rest of the world
At least it's not secure in 2005 in the Hague
Conference for private international law there was made an agreement and convention on choice of court agreements
but it's only five years later ratified by Mexico and
The European Union and the United States have signed but not ratified yet. I don't know what what they are waiting for but so
Until today, it's very difficult. There is no level playing field because if focus state
Court judgments, it's not sure that they can
That they they will be enforced all over the world. So
That may change in the future
Now what happens now in this competition for jurisdiction?
or
Competition for commercial disputes on the on the side of the providers state providers
We don't only have this brochure law made in Germany
But we have as well now the first thing which happened
Reform a legal reform
Which is not yet, it's just underway, but it's an initiative of the
Bundelsrat the federal
legislative chamber and
it was an initiative of Hamburg and not on the fine and
on 7th, May
It was the the Bundelsrat the states the federal states
Of Germany, they decided to to bring in this initiatives this legal initiative and now it's in the Bundelsrach and
the point is
They want to introduce English as a possible language in commercial courts, which is
Well as we are talking here now not so surprising but still for there's a lot of resistance against this initiative
among lawyers and politicians
They don't want well, there are articles and journals or in
The newspapers saying this is the end of the German
Legal culture and so on but I think it's a very good point if you want to compete for international commercial
Disputes, of course, you have to talk English in courts as well
Further issues for reform. I think it's not enough and more will happen, but this shows
that
The the competition circle somehow works there is demand and the of course the arbitration
Institutions always were competing for these disputes because they earn a lot of money with that
But now that's my point even the state
courts or the states
Which run these courts?
Start to answer to this competition, but there are further issues
We could do because there are a lot of other
Advantages of international commercial arbitration, which they have over state courts and one
Thing is that you can choose the judges when you have an arbitral agreement an arbitration agreement
You can choose experts as judges
whereas in in
State courts you can make a choice of court agreement, but you can only choose
locally
The local jurisdiction for instance of Hamburg, but then there is a functional organization of the courts
There are commercial courts and other the ordinary courts and then there's a abt's Christian
The land great and the uber land is great and the federal court of justice and you can't decide okay
I want this and that chamber to decide so there is a
only already 20 years ago, there was a
suggestion unheard of
That you can should introduce functional choice of forum clauses. That should be possible that you and
Choose an individual judge or chamber or also you say I don't want to start and the land correct
But I want to start already at the uber land is correct and choose commercial scene aid for instance
Or something like that and the second thing is you have always these stages of appeal
they have the same justice delayed is justice denied and when some of you studied law you can
Probably, you know, some of these cases which went to the European Court of Justice and then back from the
Amtskirich Namburg to Landkirich to big a heart to ECJ and back
And then you need eight years to enforce a claim of 75 euros in consumer issues or something
So that is not really a very efficient system for commercial disputes
So there is the idea that predispute exclusion of stages of appeal should be allowed now at the in the current system you can't
Exclude that predispute only after the judgment you can say, okay
We don't want to go to the federal court of justice or something
But you can't do that in advance
The intended outcome would be that there starts a competition
Between courts as well in Germany between special courts and in certain cities for instance in Hamburg for a meritum law
Or in Bremen as well for meritum law or for the cotton trade or in Munich for software
things so that judges specialize and get a special reputation and
That's basically in some
Branches we have that already because for instance the Landkirich in Munich is so big
that they already have specialized chambers for software things somewhere because they have a lot of software industry there and
That should be enforced this kind of competition so that we have efficient dispute resolution services
Which work as well for global commerce?
Why should we do that?
Besides the factor that we produce far too many lawyers in Germany
And so then if we can have some of them
Their money and international commercial disputes that would be nice
For Germany from that standpoint, but from the legal standpoint the advantage of public courts over private
arbitrary arbitrary units is that public courts and by
by
Solving disputes private disputes commercial disputes they at the same time
Contribute to the public good which is called legal certainty, and that's by precedent because well
It was the old
Posner who said Richard Posner who said president is a byproduct of the litigation process and
Arbitrary awards are published increasingly published
but still it's rare in total numbers and the problem then is that you don't have any legal certainty and
So that's an advantage of public courts one advantage
another future idea for in reform may be
That you could rearrange public courts in a way that their impartiality in international
Cases would be increased by be or multinational or European
Consistency of the judges because there is still it's described in all the law books that there is a home ward
bias of all state courts and
You could abolish that by by having courts for instance well regional and Europe for instance
Which are specialized on the Dutch German trade or whatever and then there could be one
Dutch judge and a German judge or whatever this idea has to be discussed there are historical examples for that
When
trade expanded in the medieval times in in Turkey
There's a nice study as well as in England the English King
granted merchants courts as a privilege to to to trade to harbors and so on to have merchants courts and
Not being a subject to common law courts
He granted that because the merchants who made trade with English people they said well
We always lose in common law courts
So we won't make trade with you anymore, and then the King said okay
Well, but trade is good for England, and he said okay. You can in these
Harbors you can have the staple courts where more merchants work
And it's not only merchants from England
But it's merchants for instance from France as well which work as judges there and in Turkey they had something like that as well
There are interesting historical studies about that
That was it more or less further references
Well on our home page you can find a lot of the publications of the a4 project
But generally here for those of you who read German these suggestions are published in the central for ex-politik
2009 then there is another interesting article of Daman enhancement on globalizing commercial litigation and as I quoted already
Idenmuller has a small part on this issue as well in his article on law as a product. Thank you very much