Thank you very much for inviting me. It's really a pleasure for me to be here.
I have to say that it's quite hard to me, it's challenging to me,
speaking after the outstanding lecturer of Professor Bruce Jonathan.
But I try to do my best and I hope at the end you really do not miss Professor Jonathan.
And I hope at the end you will be really interested in the traffic accident compensation.
The aim of this presentation, of this lecture, is not to offer you a final answer
to no fault insurance and alternative compensation schemes.
But it's to contribute, to debate about no fault insurance
and to give you an idea on what no fault insurance is
and the problems and advantages and drawbacks of no fault insurance.
This presentation will be divided at least in five parts.
In first part I will briefly summarize the critics against the law
and automobile liability insurance from the standpoint of cost and compensation.
And then I will analyze the taxonomy of no fault plans,
pure no fault, partial no fault and the so-called choice no fault insurance,
which is the most recent proposal in the United States.
Then I will analyze the impact of these alternative compensation plans,
such as no fault insurance on cost and compensation.
And in fourth part I will analyze the impact of no fault insurance on fairness and deterrence.
In fact, the main problem in no fault insurance is a link to the extent to which no fault insurance
replaces tort law.
In fact, the standard argument against no fault insurance is that by replacing tort law
it will undermine the achievement of fairness and deterrence.
And in the last part I will try to overcome these critics against no fault insurance.
So let's start with the first part.
Before, what you can ask me first of all, why traffic accidents?
Maybe it's a boring topic, I don't know.
But it's interesting traffic accident compensation in a low-economics perspective
for two essential reasons, as Professor Garabresi argued.
The first reason is the social impact of traffic accidents.
So it is interesting to analyze, individualize, which is the best way
how to spread the cost of traffic accidents.
The second argument is that traffic accidents represent the most important case of unintentional tort.
And so it is interesting to analyze if the tort law, the traditional tort law,
is an efficient rule also in the field of unintentional tort.
So this reason leads me to study traffic accident compensation.
Let's start with the first part of this presentation.
I briefly summarized the critics against tort law from the standpoint of cost and compensation.
In particular, American scholars argue that tort law fails in the cost reduction.
Fails tort law fails in the reduction of primary, secondary, and tertiary cost.
As you know, the social cost of accident is given by prevention, cost of prevention, damages,
and then administrative cost.
Let's read this slide, the primary cost reduction.
The aim of tort law is the primary cost reduction, the reduction of the number and severity of accident.
To achieve the aim of cost reduction, we have to discover what causes accident
and then to check the strategies to prevent these causes
or to individualize deterrent measures to discourage dangerous activity.
Instead, tort law focuses attention only on additional risks caused by negligence
and not on the general riskiness activity.
Not only carelessness, also the factors could cause accident
and in any case the focus on carelessness could prevent only accident
which could be caused by carelessness.
But the results are not the way in which tort law fails to reduce primary cost.
The focus on enduring fault could be incentive on the one side
to endure to escape or to cover up their fault
and on the other side could incentive the victims to amplify the extent of the injury or fault
to maximize the chance to have compensation.
Shift now to primary cost, secondary cost.
American scholars argue that tort law fails also in its secondary cost reduction.
What is important for secondary cost reduction?
To reduce the impact of accident, to reduce the damages.
So it is important for the secondary cost reduction, what?
To supply a prompt compensation to victims
or to supply a prompt access to rehabilitation programs.
But the actual structure of tort law fails in this.
Tort law involves long delays in compensation.
Statistics in the United States shows that tort law victims of traffic accident
and victims of accidents receives compensation after two or three years.
So there are long delays in compensation.
There is also another disincentive in the secondary cost reduction.
Victims have an incentive to maximize rather than to minimize the losses.
And so delaying compensation and this financial disincentive
of course contribute ineffectiveness of secondary cost reduction.
Shift now from secondary cost reduction to tertiary cost reduction, the administrative cost.
Tort law is enabled to minimize its operational cost
because tort law involves a large number of persons
and a huge cost because there are legal fees, judicial costs, litigation costs.
It is necessary to extend, to assess the extent of damages.
So tort law is enabled to minimize its operational cost.
I briefly summarized the critics against tort law, economic objection against tort law.
But American scholars have criticized tort law also from some point of compensation.
In particular, American scholars point out the problem of disequilibrium in compensation.
Tort law overcompensates small injury and undercompensates serious injury.
We can read just to give you an idea.
Torts systematically produce overcompensation of less severely injured
and undercompensation of poorer more seriously injured ones.
Because litigation is risky and costly,
defendants often settle small claim at inflated level attractive to plaintiff.
By contrast, plaintiff with large claims and poor plaintiff tend to avoid prolonged litigation
needed or secure full compensation opting instead to settle early for years.
And just what Professor Hubble, economic incentive procedure to compensate small claim
because of their nuisance failure and undercompensate large one because victims need an immediate payment
while the legal system allow defendants for you.
Let's focus now our attention in the field of traffic accident.
Tort law is always filtered through liability insurance in the field of traffic accident.
In particular, tort law and liability insurance are combined together as third party insurance.
And American scholars have criticized the traditional automobile liability insurance
as the worst system imaginable, a system which is cruel, corrupt, deleterious,
a system that fails in the law spreading.
So I can ask why this automobile liability insurance is as characterized as the worst system imaginable.
I tried to give you an answer because the efficiency of tort law are exaggerated by the incidents,
by the presence of insurance law, the liability insurance,
and in particular by the presence of the so-called third party insurance.
What is third party insurance?
Third party insurance, the liability insurance is designed as third party insurance.
Third party insurance is a general part of the system insurance of risks,
which aims to protect the insured party against the risks of liabilities
in the case of damages caused to a third party in the case of traffic accident.
So the design of third party insurance is to supply financial protection to the insured party
against third party claims in the case of traffic accident.
As you can see, the structure, the design of third party insurance is a bilateral contract
because it's concluding its binding among the insured and the insured party.
But it reveals the interest of a third person, the injured person.
The injured person, the victim, has no contractual relationship with the insurer as well.
And there is another important thing in the design of third party insurance.
There is a separation between the person who pays insurance premium, the insured party,
and the person who receives basically the compensation.
The insurance party, of course, the insurance premium who receives compensation
is not the insurance party but the victim.
So I argue that in third party insurance, the lack of contractual relationship
between the insurer and the insured person, the victim,
and this separation between the person who pays insurance premium
and the person who receives compensation leads to an alteration of incentives.
And because of this alteration of incentive, this system does not work in a correct way.
It does not run in a correct way.
So what exactly is that the third party insurance leads to an alteration?
An alteration of incentive. There is an incentive in this system.
For example, the insurer has no incentive and gives a good compensation to the injured person
because he has no contractual relationship with them.
That is to say, they lack compensation under compensation at a transaction cost.
Not only the insurer doesn't know exactly who will be the injured person,
a clefshard or a burlesque on his son.
Of course, if the injured person is a clefshard, the insurer will be very happy
because he has to pay not so much money.
And the exact amount of compensation and cannot tailor the insurance premium
to the income profile of the insured.
And thereby, the insurer overcharges the insurance premium.
Of course, overcharges the changeable part of the insurance premium.
It's called loan.
So, incentive for the insured party.
American scholar academics argue that the lack of contractual relationship
encourages moral hazard behavior, the lack of contractual relationship
between the insurer and the insured party, of course.
The insured party tend to overestimate the extent of damages and, consequently, the compensation.
This is the problem of fraud in the insurance market.
The insured party.
The insured party has no incentive in finding an insurance company
which provides the good compensation services because, as it will do,
the insured party is interested only in financial protection
against third-party claims in case of traffic accidents.
It does not receive any compensation.
For this reason, the insured party doesn't matter if the insurer give a good compensation or not,
or if there are delays in compensation.
So, for this reason, the lack of contractor, the design of third-party insurance,
the lack of contractual relationship among the insurer and the insured,
and the separation between the person who pays insurance premium
and the person who receives, basically.
In fact, the compensation leads to this alteration of incentives.
And for this reason, this system does not work, does not run in a correct way.
These critics against the traditional liability insurance,
automobile liability insurance, culminated with adoption of no-fault insurance,
of no-fault plans.
The debate on a fault plan began, interesting enough, in the United States in 1975.
Why two eminent academics, Professor Robert Keaton and Jeffrey Connell,
prepare the study called a basic protection for the traffic victims?
This book is the milestone of no-fault insurance.
In the first part of this book, the two academics have criticized strong law
from the standpoint of cost and compensation,
and then they propose an alternative compensation scheme, such as no-fault.
After the publication of this book in 1975, several states in the United States,
such as Massachusetts in 1971, moved from traditional tort law
to no-fault insurance in the field of traffic accidents.
And nowadays, we have more or less 20 states in the United States,
which adopted no-fault insurance.
I would like just to underline that in the United States,
insurance law and automobile insurance as well are in the domain of subtle law,
so we have 50 different legislation.
But you can ask me, what is no-fault insurance?
Of course, there is an obvious need to define this trial, no-fault plan.
If you ever look, for example, in a no-legal dictionary,
you can read that no-fault is a type of automobile insurance
that provides compensation without fault.
But it's not true, because no-fault plan, no-fault insurance,
is not mayoral insurance, is a complete alternative compensation scheme.
And as two primary characteristics,
replace tort law with the compulsory first-party insurance for personal injuries.
And then there are restrictions on the right to sue for damages.
So these are the two main characteristics,
compulsory first-party insurance for personal injuries,
and then restrictions on the right to sue for damages.
These two characteristics are combined in different ways in no-fault plans,
because we really do not have a no-fault plan.
We have no-fault plans, a taxonomy of no-fault plans.
We have pure no-fault, ebrino fault, and choice no-fault insurance.
We have also other type of no-fault plans,
but I focus my attention on this type,
on pure no-fault, ebrino fault, and choice no-fault insurance.
So let's start with pure no-fault insurance.
Pure no-fault insurance replaces two court, tort law, and field of traffic accident.
And victims cannot sue for damages.
And they must recover, collect compensation from their own insurer
under a compulsory first-party insurance.
And there is no compensation for pain and suffering.
Usually, a pure no-fault plan is administrative by the state,
and not by private insurer.
For example, Quebec, Israel, New Zealand adopted a pure no-fault insurance,
and in Quebec is administrative by an agency, is administrative by the state.
In New Zealand, it's a form of social security as workman compensation.
In Israel, pure no-fault insurance is administrative by private insurers,
but under the control of the state.
Pure no-fault, as described, does not exist in the United States,
but it does exist in Quebec and Israel and in New Zealand.
Just to summarize, under pure no-fault victims must always collect compensation from their own insurance.
There is no compensation for pain and suffering.
Under pure no-fault victims, recovery for economic losses,
medical expenses and counter-interruption can be for very large or perhaps even unlimited.
Shift now from pure no-fault to hybrid no-fault or partial no-fault.
Hybrid no-fault is a very complicated model because tort law, the traditional out liability insurance,
and pure no-fault are combined together.
Let's see how this mixed system works.
The key word to understand hybrid no-fault is threshold or cap.
If the losses do not exceed the threshold, victims cannot sue for damages,
and they must collect compensation from their own insurer under a first part insurance,
and there is no compensation for pain and suffering.
But if the losses do exceed this threshold, this cap, victims are allowed to opt out no-fault and sue for damages,
and they can sue for damages and have full compensation.
Just to give you an idea, when the United States moved from traditional tort law to no-fault insurance,
what they have adopted is an hybrid model, this hybrid model.
And some states such as Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, New York State, Utah, Kansas, Texas, Massachusetts, Michigan
adopted this compensation scheme, this hybrid no-fault scheme to compensate victims of traffic accidents.
We can say that the so-called threshold can take a dollar form expressed in terms of cost of medical services,
the victim receive an account of the accident, or in a verbal form expressed the seriousness of victim's injury.
As I told you at the beginning, before, insurance law and automobile insurance is in domain of state law,
so each state has its own model and adopted a different threshold.
There are states with a high threshold and states with a low threshold.
This is really important to verify later the impact on no-fault insurance on compensation and costs.
So, shift now to just no-fault insurance.
As I told you, it's a more recent proposal in the United States.
In this system, consumers have the option to choose among two types of policy insurance,
a low-cost insurance policy with restriction on feeling loss rate,
and a high-cost policy insurance with fully throat rise.
I will focus my attention on hybrid no-fault and pure no-fault,
because we really do not have yet studies on choice no-fault insurance,
and particularly empirical evidence on choice no-fault insurance.
You can see the different design of compensation schemes.
The first one, as I explained before, is the scheme of the traditional automobile liability insurance,
which is based on third-party insurance.
The second one is pure no-fault.
The aim of pure no-fault and first-party insurance is to supply compensation to the insured party,
and, of course, not to protect him against the risks of liability,
and not to protect him against third-party claims as in third-party insurance.
Then, the last hybrid system, where third-party insurance and fourth-party insurance are combined together.
If the losses do not exceed the threshold,
the victim must collect compensation from their own insurer and their first-party insurance.
If the losses do exceed the threshold,
the victims are allowed to opt out no-fault and then sue the insurer for damages
under the traditional liability insurance.
In which way these two different designs are able to reduce the costs of accidents
and to supply prompt compensation to traffic victims?
It's quite easy for compensation because in pure no-fault and hybrid no-fault for the losses
which do not exceed the threshold, victims do not sue for damages.
They receive compensation easily from their own insurance, so there is no delay in compensation.
And statistics show that pure no-fault is impressive from the standpoint of compensation.
There are no delays in compensation.
We can read this about the impact of no-fault insurance on compensation.
Advocates of no-fault, out-of-fault first-party insurance argue that no-fault can compensate more traffic victims
more promptly and the lower administrative costs than third-party liability insurance.
No-fault compensation has the potential to provide a consistent amount of damages for similarly situated cases.
This is achievable because the state attempts to compensate any victim so long as they fulfill the eligibility criteria.
The eligibility criteria are the same for all victims regardless of their backgrounds.
No-fault compensation advocates argue that traffic liability on the other hand is inconsistent with lawyer talents.
For example, it can make a significant difference in the amount of compensation a victim is given.
No-fault advocates therefore conclude that no-fault compensation is a fairer and more egalitarian scheme for a society to adopt.
Just another thought on compensation.
A full compensation system has the advantages of providing immediate financial help since the state does not have to separate or assess whether the defendant committed at fault.
And then the victim claims his compensation to his insurance company.
Let's analyze now the impact of no-fault insurance, no-fault plans on costs.
In which way this different design can reduce the cost?
First of all, no-fault insurance, no-fault plans curtail start action to cure under pure no-fault.
Cure tail start action if damages does not exceed the threshold in hybrid system and thereby cuts the litigation cost.
B, excludes coverage for pen and suffering and in general for all non-pecuniary losses.
B, excludes coverage for small economic losses whose expected costs are unlikely to be especially disruptive and insured and where moral dark problems may be significant.
And then tailors and adopt insurance premium for economic loss to the income profile of the individual insured or class of insured so as to avoid what might otherwise entail a regressive form across subsidization.
Instead, third party insurance, as we know, cannot tailor the premium for economic loss to the income profile of insured because compensation goes to a third party and the insurer doesn't know who will be the insured party.
So this is in theory, for this reason, first party insurance can reduce costs, but I have to say that we really do not have a single answer regarding the impact of no-fault on insurance premium on cost and litigation costs.
But the effect is related to the taxonomy of no-fault plan.
As regard the impact on insurance premium, the insurance premium may be lowered depending on the level of the first party benefits and curtailment of protection under no-fault.
The effect of no-fault on insurance premium is different and it is related to taxonomy of no-fault system. Under pure no-fault, the effects on premium are impressive.
Under hybrid no-fault, the impact on insurance premium depends on the threshold. Under pure no-fault, the effects on premium are impressive.
Why? Because there is a huge saving in cost. There is curtailment of protection. So we really do not have litigation costs. We really do not have legal fees.
And there is no compensation for pain and suffering. So there is a huge saving in cost. And for this reason, insurance premium could be lowered.
Under hybrid no-fault, the impact on insurance premium depends on the threshold. If the threshold is high, a night percentage of damages is covered under no-fault.
This means high curtailment of protection, less litigation costs, no compensation for pain and suffering.
And insurance premiums are lower. In fact, Michigan has the lowest insurance premiums in the United States.
On the other hand, if the threshold is low, only a small percentage of damages is covered under no-fault. And a night percentage is covered under tort law.
With high costs, and thereby insurance premiums are higher. Just to give you an idea, Massachusetts has a no-fault plan with the lowest threshold.
And Massachusetts has the highest insurance premiums in the United States, of course, in the field of traffic accidents.
So we really do not have a single answer to the impact of no-fault on insurance premiums. These are related to the exalomy of no-fault.
And in particular, in the hybrid system, it is related to the threshold.
The same is the fact on litigation costs. The impact of no-fault on litigation costs is different, of course, among pure no-fault and hybrid no-fault.
In pure no-fault, it is impressive because in pure no-fault, victims cannot see for damages. So litigation costs are zero.
In hybrid system, the effect on litigation costs depends, also in this case, on the threshold.
If the threshold is high, there is a large curtailment of protection and saving in litigation costs.
Instead, with the threshold is low, only a small percentage of damages is covered under no-fault system. And a percentage in tort.
Instead, with the modest no-fault plan, victims have an incentive to overestimate their damages and to opt out no-fault and sue for damages.
This happens in Massachusetts because it has a really modest no-fault plan.
Let's analyze, shift now to the problem of deterrence and fairness in no-fault system.
Till now, we have analyzed some advantages of no-fault insurance on cost and compensation.
But no-fault insurance has also some disadvantages, some drawbacks.
And these drawbacks are linked to the extent to which no-fault insurance replaces tort law.
The standard argument is that by replacing tort law, no-fault insurance under mean the achievement of fairness and deterrence.
I'm clearly sympathetic towards no-fault insurance, and so I try to overcome this critique against no-fault insurance.
So, I will focus my attention on deterrence, and if we have some time, I will talk also about the problem of fairness.
But I think that the crucial problem in no-fault insurance is the problem of deterrence.
As I told you, the standard argument is that by replacing tort law, it will under mean the achievement of fairness and deterrence, the achievement of deterrence.
In particular, some scholars argue that no-fault insurance reduces driver's incentive to drive carefully,
because lowers the cost of driving negligently by limiting the first-part liability in the case of damages caused to a third party, and thereby increases the accident rate.
So, I try to overcome this critique against no-fault insurance with three arguments.
The first is so-called first-party safety incentive, the role played by first-party safety incentive.
The second one is the role played by insurance premium, and then empirical findings, some empirical evidence.
Because, in contrast to the monastery of law and economics, there is a bit of empirical research in the field of traffic accident, and so we can learn something from this empirical research.
Let's start with my first argument, the so-called first-party safety incentive.
I argue that a driver, a motorist, has an incentive to drive carefully under tort and under no-fault as well, because it can be, at the same time, endured or endured.
This argument is quite easily, but it's true.
I think that on the road, in the general sense, of course, all of us can be plaintiffs or defendants.
When I drive, I drive safely to preserve myself, first of all, and I really do not think about tort law or no-fault insurance.
The first thing is first-party safety incentive, but it's not enough, because in any case, no-fault plan preserves tort law for property damages.
Also, in no-fault insurance, there is a residual role of tort law.
So, in this case, the current effect of tort law is, in any case, preserved.
In every system, when the losses do exceed the threshold, victims are allowed to opt out no-fault and sue for damages.
Also, in this case, there is a residual role of tort law, also in no-fault system.
And so, the current effect of tort law is, in any case, is in any way preserved, also in no-fault plan.
Shifting now to my second argument, the role played by insurance premiums.
I think that it is important to promote safety and to promote safe behaviors and feel the traffic accidents.
The way in which insurance premiums are charged and the way in which insurance premiums reflect bad driving.
It is not so important if the compensation, if I drive under tort or under no-fault, is important, the role of insurance premiums.
We can read.
So, tort law is always filtered through insurance, and so, given the determination of the insurance,
how much the tort system reduces bad driving or giving a motorist an incentive to drive carefully?
The explanation might be that the prospect of insurance premiums increases, seeks to avoid faulty accidents.
In the liability insurance, the prospect of insurance premiums increases in case of bad driving, leading incentive to drive carefully.
No-fault give a motorist basically the same incentive.
Layability insurance charge high premiums to high-risk motorists and undoubtedly discourage some of these motorists from driving.
And then no-fault insurance also charge these motorist high premiums and consequently provide them a similar deterrent element.
But you can ask me, this is a curiosity.
How the insurance on a fault system could know if the insurance is accident-prone or a bad driver to charge the premiums?
There is a special system, so the insurer receives the policy report, and so they know everything about the accident,
and so the insurer knows exactly which driver is accident-prone or not, and so they can charge high premiums to high-risk motorists.
In this perspective, I would like to just underline that empirical evidence shows an increase of traffic accidents in countries in which the insurance premiums are fluctuated.
Chief, now, from the role played by the insurance premium to my third argument, empirical evidence.
As I told you, there is a bit of empirical research in the field of traffic accidents.
Let's analyze this empirical research.
So, is it true that no-fault insurance reduces driver's incentive to drive carefully and thereby increases the accident rate?
This is a theoretical issue.
So, let's see what the empirical issue is.
The research takes a form of regression explaining the accident rate involving fatalities in no-fault states.
Let's start with the USA experience.
In the USA, there are four empirical research on the impact of no-fault insurance on driver behaviors and on traffic accident rate.
The first study was prepared by Landes in 1982, and this study was published in the Journal of Land Economics.
Landes found an increase of traffic accident rate of 4% in no-fault states with a low threshold, and she found an increase of 9% of traffic accident rate in no-fault states with a high threshold.
So, Landes' output suggests a significant erosion in safety incentives in moving from tort law to no-fault insurance.
But, we have another study prepared by Zadar and Lund in 1886 and published in the Journal of Risk and Insurance.
This order found a decrease of accident rate in no-fault states, so they found an opposite result.
But, it's not enough. There is another study in 1886, prepared by Kucinowski and Yang, published always in the Journal of Risk and Insurance,
and they found no relationship between the introduction of no-fault insurance and accident rate.
So, no-fault insurance is neutral. No-fault insurance has no effect on deterrence, no effect on driver behaviors.
There is the last study, a more recent empirical research, prepared by Kucin and Deja, published in the Journal of Land Economics in 2004.
This order found an increase of traffic accident rate in no-fault states.
So, as you can see, we really do not have a final answer from empirical research.
A study found significantly erosion in safety in moving from tort law to no-fault insurance.
Another study found no relationship between the introduction of no-fault insurance and accident rate,
and then there is another study that found a decrease of traffic accident in no-fault states.
So, we really do not have a final answer from empirical research.
How can I explain these different results, these ambiguous results?
The authors used different methodological approaches, used different statistical variables,
and they have taken into account different periods.
So, I guess, for this reason, we have so ambiguous results in empirical research.
Just to give you some references of this empirical research, Landes ensures liability and accident,
a theoretical and empirical investigation of the effect of no-fault accident to 25 Journal of Land Economics.
Then Zadron-Luhn re-analyzes of the effects of no-fault insurance on fatal crashes, Journal of Risk and Insurance 1986.
Then Kucinowski and Young determined the effect of no-fault automobile insurance on empirical findings,
published in the Journal of Risk and Insurance, and then the more recent study by Kucin and Deja,
the effect of automobile insurance and accident liability law on traffic fatalities,
published in 2004 in the Journal of Law and Economics.
So, let's analyze now the Québec experience.
We can learn something more from Québec experience, from empirical research in Québec.
As I told you, Québec adopted a pure no-fault system.
That is to say, victims cannot sue for damages, must collect compensation from their insurer.
And when Québec moved from the traditional tort system to pure no-fault,
it changed also the way in which it changed also insurance premiums.
They introduced pure no-fault and flat rated premiums, flat rated premiums of standard premiums.
And we have two empirical research in this field.
The first one prepared by Godry in 1988.
He found an increase of traffic accidents in moving from tort law to pure no-fault insurance.
But Godry argued that this rise in traffic accidents was due to flat rated premiums and not to pure no-fault itself.
And then we have also another empirical research prepared by Mary Devlin in 1992.
And she found also a rise in traffic accidents.
In 1993 or 1992, Québec moved and amended his no-fault plan.
He has always pure no-fault insurance but moved from flat rated premiums to experience rated premiums.
From 1992 till now, they have now experienced rated premiums.
And in 2004, the Automobile Society of SAAQ, the Automobile Insurance Society of Québec, prepared another empirical research.
And they found a significantly decrease of traffic accidents from 1992 to 2004, so in moving from flat rated premiums to experience rated premiums.
So this is really important because this confirms the important role of insurance premiums in the field of traffic accidents.
That is to say that what is important in promoting safety in the field of traffic accidents, I think, is the way in which insurance premiums are charged and the way in which insurance premiums are reflected by driving.
And this empirical research confirms this issue.
So as I told you at the beginning, the aim of this presentation, of course, is not to give you a final answer to no-fault insurance.
But I would like to contribute to debate about no-fault insurance and to give you an idea of the advantages and drawbacks of no-fault insurance.
At the end, I can say that we really do not have a final answer to no-fault insurance, but the impact on insurance premium or litigation costs on compensation is always related to the taxonomy of no-fault.
It depends on the level of first party benefits and depends on the threshold.
I have finished, and so thank you very much for your attention.